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Overview 
This paper-based dissertation is structured in two parts. A synopsis provides a theoretical 
frame, summarizes the empirical findings, and connects and embeds them into the literature. 
The second part consists of the empirical findings reported in four articles as appendices A to 
D. Because the articles were written for publication and changed due to various suggestions 
of reviewers and editors, each of the articles form independent reports that may have content-
related redundancies (overlaps) and excursions that might not directly relate to the topic of 
this dissertation. Especially our third report (Appendix C) was written to a broad audience and 
with a broader implication and therefore entails examples from other fields and a large 
theoretical part. 
The synopsis starts with an overview on priming in social psychology in order to point out 
the historical development of the field and the challenges that it faces nowadays. This 
overview is intended to demonstrate the general state of the field and to show that money 
priming - as one field of priming in social psychology – faces similar challenges as the field 
in general. The overview on priming is followed by an overview on money priming, its 
proposed underlying mechanisms and recent critiques. I then follow with a description of 
some initial studies (not reported in greater detail) to show how this led me to my research 
program. To introduce my research I also explain in more detail the research by Caruso, 
Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013), because the incoherencies of this paper inspired the research 
that resulted in my three subsequent articles (Appendix A-C). A description of the key 
findings of the studies (see below) together with some comments, conclusions, and 
implications for the field that did not necessarily make their way into the respective articles, 
form the main part of this synopsis. I end with a general discussion that connects the 
individual findings and articulates implications of this research for the field.  
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The second part consists of eleven studies that are reported in more detail. The first three 
studies deal with the subjective standing in the social hierarchy as an important moderator for 
effects of money priming (Appendix A). Then, a meta-analysis of seven studies that tests 
whether money primes change political views is reported. It reveals tentative evidence that the 
subjective standing in the social hierarchy moderates this effect as well (Appendix B). 
Appendix C is a theoretical paper on non-significant replications in which an exploratory 
study with German psychology students indicates that they tend to overinterpret the evidence 
of non-significant replications. Appendix D is a preregistered report that entails a pilot study. 
Here we describe a specific preregistered study, which we propose in order to test whether 
money primes affect the self-focus of a person or not.    
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Introduction 
Priming is one of the most controversial and popular fields in Social Psychology. Soon 
after the pioneering work from Meyer and Schvaneveldt (1971) and even earlier from Karl 
Lashley (for review see: Bargh, 2014), the field began flowering, produced many astonishing 
findings (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & 
Trötschel, 2001; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998; Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979) and quickly became one 
of the most popular fields in psychology for the popular media (e.g., BBC, 2012; Fehrenbach, 
2010; Matter, 2013; Pryor, 2016; Yuhas, 2015), or, as Higgins and Eitam (2014) put it, 
priming “morphed from being a stagehand to being the star of the show“ (p. 225). The last 40 
years have shown that subtle environmental cues can activate social norms such as in-group 
loyalty (Hertel & Kerr, 2001), stereotypes on race and gender (Chen & Bargh, 1997; Shih, 
Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999), goals that influence performance and cooperation (Bargh et al., 
2001), and concepts that provoke prosocial behavior (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).  
Nowadays, in a time where Psychology seems to be in a crisis of confidence (Pashler & 
Wagenmakers, 2012), “priming research has been a particular target for those who care about 
replication in psychology” (Cesario, 2014, p. 40) and the “field is now the poster child for 
doubts about the integrity of psychological research” (Kahneman, 2012). This might have 
several reasons. First, priming research produced a plethora of truly surprising and 
astonishing findings that probably seem so extraordinary because the manipulation is subtle, 
and works completely without a person’s awareness of this influence. Second, priming 
research, still being in its infancy, often lacks a clear explanation and knowledge on the 
psychological mechanisms and limiting factors (Cesario, 2014; Molden, 2014) and therefore 
the research might require some experience and certain skills to obtain and reproduce priming 
effects (Kahneman, 2012). Be that as it may, the comparatively young field, which has 
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developed dramatically in the last decades and which has received a great amount of 
attention, is today viewed with increasing skepticism regarding the reliability of its findings 
(Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Loersch, 2016).  
In a first step I will give a brief overview on priming in social psychology, the current 
stage of research and new challenges priming researchers are facing nowadays. Furthermore, 
I will describe in more detail some of the critique that has been voiced on priming research. 
This introduction on priming is intended to help the reader understand a subfield that is – 
with its problems, critiques and theoretical approach – in a way a typical example for the 
field in general: money priming. Money priming is comparatively young but has already 
undergone the same types of critiques and challenges as priming research in general. In a 
subsequent step I will describe my own research and how it connects to the current 
challenges that priming researchers are faced with.  
 
Priming in Social Psychology 
Priming can be described as a facilitating effect of any event or action on a subsequent 
associated response (Molden, 2014; Tulving, 1983). More specifically it is as an implicit 
memory effect where the exposure to a stimulus affects a person’s response to a subsequent 
stimulus (Smith & Branscombe, 1987). Priming effects can be found when encountering a 
stimulus a second time (repetition priming), when a stimulus activates a related concept 
(semantic priming) or when an associated goal (goal priming) is triggered (Doyen, Klein, 
Simons, & Cleeremans, 2014). However, within social psychology, research focused 
primarily on the activation of social representations such as social norms, stereotypes, goals 
or traits (Molden, 2014). In other words, until today, social psychologists typically want to 
study how social representations influence real world judgments, beliefs and actions, rather 
than studying the structure of knowledge representations in the memory (Doyen et al., 2014).  
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The early work on priming in social psychology focused on the perception of social 
targets, for example how primes can affect judgment on personalities (Srull & Wyer, 1979), 
one’s own emotions (Sinclair, Hoffman, Mark, Martin, & Pickering, 1994) and the activation 
of stereotypes (Devine, 1989) to name only a few. However, beginning in the 90’s the focus 
shifted from altering the perception of social targets to altering actual behavior (Molden, 
2014) of many kinds (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996; Bargh et al., 2001; Hassin, Ferguson, 
Shidlovski, & Gross, 2007; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Hence, researchers investigated at 
this time what types of behavior could be primed and which stimuli could be used to provoke 
a behavior up to a point where the same prime can provoke a variety of qualitatively different 
effects that do not even seem to have the same mediating mechanism (Bargh, 2006). 
Arguably this focus on discovering new effects, which without doubt provoked a plethora of 
highly diverse findings, also led to negligence for the theoretical framework and the 
mediating psychological mechanisms underlying these effects. 
So it is not surprising that one frequent concern about the field that is raised by priming 
researchers themselves is its lack of theoretical foundation or in other words, the ability to 
specifically describe the mediating psychological mechanism that triggers an effect (Cesario, 
2014; Higgins & Eitam, 2014; Locke, 2015; Molden, 2014). However, the recent skepticism 
about the nature, reliability and validity of priming effects (as described in: Bargh, 2014; 
Cesario, 2014; Kahneman, 2012) did not emerge due to insufficient knowledge about the 
mediating mechanisms of priming effects, but due to prominent failures to replicate the 
original effects (e.g., de Molière & Harris, 2016; Donnellan, Lucas, & Cesario, 2015; Gomes 
& McCullough, 2015; Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; Klein et al., 2014; Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015; Pashler, Coburn, & Harris, 2012; Pashler, Rohrer, & Harris, 
2013; Shanks et al., 2013; Wortman, Donnellan, & Lucas, 2014). In their well noted 
replication attempt Doyen, Klein, Pichon, and Cleeremans (2012) not only failed to replicate 
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Bargh et al.’s (1996) famous elderly priming experiment - which became the flagship 
experiment for priming research that is cited in every textbook on social psychology - but 
also provided evidence that the effect might be due to a simple experimenter bias. While 
many priming researchers argue that unsuccessful replications in priming research should 
actually be expected, considering the insufficient knowledge about the mechanisms and 
limiting factors (e.g., Cesario, 2014), it has led others to question priming effects in general 
(e.g., Harris et al., 2013). Ultimately this general skepticism towards priming effects in social 
psychology voiced mainly from cognitive psychologists might also be due to a third problem 
that priming research is facing. Researchers from different backgrounds do not yet fully agree 
on a clear definition of priming in general. First and foremost, researchers from cognitive and 
social psychology disagree on whether a prime needs to be processed without awareness or 
not and which mediating mechanisms can explain the effects (Doyen et al., 2012; Doyen et 
al., 2014). Furthermore, cognitive psychologists often argue that priming effects last only 
several seconds and not as proposed in many priming experiments in social psychology, 
several minutes (e.g., Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015; cf., Wentura & Rothermund, 2014). 
Thus, in light of a lack of theoretical precision for the mechanisms, a lack of robust 
replicability and a lack of a common ground of priming between different fields1, priming in 
social psychology has some challenges – or as framed by Zanna and Fazio (1982) second- or 
third-generation questions – that priming researchers need to tackle. Bargh (2006) listed 
some of these challenges for the field such as to investigate which role individual differences 
play in the effectiveness of a prime and how one prime can produce such qualitatively 
different effects. But probably the most urging challenge in priming research is the lack of 
replicability in the field (Kahneman, 2012). However, as a general believer in priming 
                     
1 I will not further elaborate on the lack of a common ground between different fields of priming (for reviews 
see: Doyen et al., 2014; Smith & DeCoster, 2000) but focus on priming research in social psychology.  
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effects, to my view the replicability problem is mainly a proxy for the need to discover the 
conditions for when (a moderator question) and ultimately why (a mechanism question) a 
phenomenon appears or disappears (Higgins & Eitam, 2014; Zanna & Fazio, 1982). This 
does neither mean that all priming effects in social psychology are real, nor does it imply that 
a lack of replicability is not a problem; I simply believe that the replication problem will 
persist unless we gain a better understanding of the mechanisms and limiting factors.  
Priming research in social psychology has already made considerable progress in this 
regard and discovered some important factors that allow predicting when priming effects 
occur (e.g., Mayo, 2015; Wheeler & Berger, 2007; Wheeler & DeMarree, 2009) and allow 
explaining why and how they occur (e.g., Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 2007; Loersch & 
Keith Payne, 2016; Wheeler & Petty, 2001). As one example, depending on the extremeness 
of the prime, assimilation effects (judgments consistent with the primed category) versus 
contrast effects (judgments opposite to the primed category) were soon discovered in priming 
research (Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). Further research helped to identify why priming 
effects occur in the expected direction or not. The subtlety versus blatancy (i.e., awareness) of 
the prime determines whether participants respond consistent with the primed category or 
whether they (over)correct for the influence (Newman & Uleman, 1990; Strack, Schwarz, 
Bless, Kübler, & Wänke, 1993).   
 
Money Priming Research 
Understanding the current state of money priming is much easier when considered in the 
context of priming research in general. Even though this strand of research evolved only ten 
years ago and only represents a subfacet of priming phenomena in social psychology, the 
field faces in many ways the same aforementioned challenges such as problems with 
replicability, unclear psychological mechanisms and general skepticism about the effect.  
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With their first and seminal findings on money priming Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) 
reasoned that humans have an abstract economic concept of money that can be activated with 
subtle primes. More specifically the authors claimed that without a person’s awareness, subtle 
money related stimuli such as pictures of money2 would heighten the accessibility of the 
proposed concept of money (Vohs et al., 2006; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). In their 
theoretical approach, this concept does not include the possession of money but only the mere 
‘idea’ of it, which – at least on a conceptual basis – discriminates the field from research that 
deals with spending money (Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008) or research that deals with effects 
of personal wealth and possessions (Johnson & Krueger, 2006; Nelson & Morrison, 2005).3  
Research has shown that the activation of the concept money can have tremendous effects 
on people’s behavior and attitudes. The two major effects seem to be that money primed 
participants put less emphasis on social relations and more emphasis on themselves and the 
achievement of personal needs and goals (Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Vohs et al., 2006; 2008; 
for review see: Vohs, 2015). To name just a few findings that concur with this general 
tendency, participants tended to work more persistently on tasks (Boucher & Kofos, 2012; 
Vohs et al., 2006; Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2013), were less vulnerable for social exclusion 
(Zhou et al., 2009), and generally focused more on themselves rather than others. This focus 
manifested in a decreased willingness to help others (Guéguen & Jacob, 2013; Pfeffer & 
DeVoe, 2009; Roberts & Roberts, 2012; Vohs et al., 2006), a preference for solitary activities 
                     
2 Frequently used money primes are: a sentence descrambling task, seeing money on a screensaver or poster 
(Vohs et al., 2006), counting and handling money (Zhou, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2009)  or subtle visual money 
cues in the background of the experiment (Hansen, Kutzner, & Wänke, 2013).  
3 In many priming experiments it is however on an operational level not clear whether only the concept of 
money or reminders of personal or others’ wealth are activated (e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; Mogilner & Aaker, 
2009; Zhou et al., 2009) and whether this actually makes any difference. 
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and increased social distance (Vohs et al., 2006), and an increased concern for ones own 
compared to other’s benefits (Gąsiorowska & Hełka, 2012; Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Teng, 
Chen, Poon, Zhang, & Jiang, 2016), even if this required immoral behavior (Gino & 
Mogilner, 2014; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013). Thus, 
while it seems that money primes help to focus and to reach ones personal goals, it is at the 
same time bad for the social self (Gasiorowska, Zaleskiewicz, & Wygrab, 2012; Vohs et al., 
2008) and eventually bad for ones own happiness (Mogilner, 2010; Quoidbach, Dunn, 
Petrides, & Mikolajczak, 2010). 
Vohs et al. (2008) suggest a market pricing orientation (Fiske, 1992) in which actions and 
choices are assessed in terms of personal inputs and outputs, as the mediating mechanism for 
their findings. This general focus is complemented by an inner state of self-sufficiency 
“wherein people put forth effort to attain personal goals and prefer to be separate from 
others“ (Vohs et al., 2006, p. 1154) and “shift their focus more toward self-related needs and 
less toward the needs of other people“ (Reutner & Wänke, 2013, p. 220). In consequence, this 
psychological state leads to a focus on the self and one’s personal goals and accordingly 
increases personal performance and the need for independency while at the same time 
reduces the will to interact with others, the sensitivity for others needs, and the willingness to 
act in ways that are not directly advantageous for oneself (Vohs et al., 2008). For critical 
psychologists, this description might appear vague and superficial (and in fact the 
psychological mechanism is not described in more detail), but other mechanisms are not 
much more specific either. 
 
MONEY,	SELF-FOCUS,	AND	POLITICS	 	
	
	 8 
Alternative Underlying Mechanisms 
Even though the suggested mechanism can explain a great deal of research, this theoretical 
framework cannot entirely explain other findings. Thus, many alternative mediating 
mechanisms have been proposed to explain some of the findings in the field.  
Gino and Pierce (2009) argue (and present evidence for their claim) that the increased 
unethical cheating of participants is induced by feelings of envy (not of self-interest), because 
the presence of money on an experimenter’s table reminds them of other people’s (in this 
case the experimenteer’s) wealth. Hansen et al. (2013) proposed that priming subjects with 
money activates the concept of money as a universal resource (see also: Lea & Webley, 2006; 
Zhou et al., 2009), which in turn triggers feelings that needs can be met and that potential 
challenges in the environment can be overcome. Because former research had demonstrated 
that human cognition adapts to problematic environments with a more detailed oriented 
approach and a lower construal level whereas save environments foster higher construal 
levels, the authors showed that the exposure to large quantities of money activates a higher 
construal level. Caruso et al. (2013) found that participants were more likely to endorse free-
market systems and to accept social inequality and social dominance when primed with 
money. In this case the authors explained their effects on underlying core beliefs of political 
right-wing orientation with the claim that money serves as a symbol (and a vehicle for the 
functioning) of free-market capitalism and therefore makes participants more likely to 
endorse free-market systems and their related concepts of social dominance and just world-
beliefs after being reminded of money.  
These explanations for money priming effects are still not exhaustive. Other hypothesized 
mechanisms to explain money priming effects suggested that subtle cues of money provoke a 
business decision frame (Jiang, Chen, & Wyer Jr, 2014; Kouchaki et al., 2013), tendencies to 
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obey moral and legal rules (Yang et al., 2013), and an existential anxiety buffer 
(Zaleskiewicz, Gasiorowska, Kesebir, Luszczynska, & Pyszczynski, 2013).  
The remarkable variety of effects and suggested mechanisms does not necessarily question 
the validity of the findings. As noted, one prime can provoke different effects with different 
underlying mechanisms (Bargh, 2006). However, while it is certainly possible that the same 
prime provokes different effects for different reasons, it seems a major challenge to the field 
(a) to analyze, which of the suggested mechanisms reliably predict one group of effects (i.e., 
discover which parsimonious explanation can explain a set of effects and discard flawed post-
hoc theories) and (b) to identify the factors that cause these different effects.  
 
Skepticism on Money Priming 
It is indispensable to mention that in the last few years and during the course of this 
research, there has been a growing skepticism on money priming. Two articles became 
suspected (and one convicted) of data fraud (Pashler, Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, & Harris, 
2016; Retraction 2014) and two large-scale attempts to replicate money priming findings 
from Caruso et al. (2013) were unsuccessful (Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer et al., 2015). Even 
more concerning, Rohrer et al. (2015) reported that both Vohs et al. (2006) and Caruso et al. 
(2013) had conducted additional unreported studies, had used additional dependent variables 
and mediators that were not reported in their original work, and had no clearly defined 
stopping rules to determine their sample sizes.  
Even though, other conceptual replications of the seminal findings from Vohs et al. (2006) 
were successful (Capaldi & Zelenski, 2016; Savani, Mead, Stillman, & Vohs, 2016; for 
overview: Vohs, 2015), the disturbing report by Rohrer and colleagues raised considerable 
attention and somewhat justified skepticism to the seminal first findings and probably the 
field in general. Inspired by this replication report and a review that used a vote-counting 
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approach to support the two major effects of money priming (Vohs, 2015), Vadillo, 
Hardwicke, and Shanks (2016) statistically examined the presented evidence. The authors 
found with different meta-analytic tools that the original studies in two papers (Caruso et al., 
2013; Vohs et al., 2006) and the subsequently presented evidence to bolster trust in money 
priming effects (Vohs, 2015) are most likely biased by selective reporting and other 
questionable research practices. Of course, the existence of unreported (and possibly non-
significant) studies does not necessarily imply that the effects are not real (Schuler, Vogel, & 
Wänke, 2017, Appendix C ), but it questions the alleged robustness and reliability of money 
priming effects (Vadillo et al., 2016) and the explanation that the opposing findings in the 
replication studies were only due to unknown moderators (see Vohs, 2015).  
 
Challenges and Future Questions to the Field 
Thus the field faces similar challenges as priming in general:  
• Do the different manipulations all work equally effective? Do they reliably activate 
the ‘idea of money’? Do they all prime the same concept?  
• When does the effect occur? What are limiting factors? Does awareness play a 
role? 
• Which roles play interindividual differences? Do people interpret or perceive the 
primes differently, thus activating different concepts? Does the prime work equally 
effective for all people? 
• Why does the effect occur? What is/are the underlying mechanism(s) for the 
effect(s)? Can some effects be explained more parsimonious with the same 
underlying mechanism? Can money primes activate different concepts depending 
on the environmental setting?  
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• Does the activation of the ‘idea of money’ conceptually and empirically differ from 
effects of other resource primes (Nelson & Morrison, 2005), thoughts about one’s 
own money (Pfeffer & DeVoe, 2009) or own expenses (Mogilner & Aaker, 2009)? 
• Does money priming really not replicate? Is the hypothesized effect (or some 
findings) based on Type-I errors? 
 
Some of these questions have been tackled by others during the course of this research, 
while I tried to tackle some of these questions myself. Yang et al. (2013) found that a small 
variation of the prime (dirty versus clean money) apparently activates different concepts, 
which either lead to a tendency for exploitation and greed or to a tendency to obey moral 
rules. Zedelius et al. (2013) investigated whether awareness alters the effects of money 
primes and found in line with previous priming research (Newman & Uleman, 1990) that the 
prime should be perceived without awareness in order to avoid contrast effects. I examined 
mainly three aspects: When does an effect occur, what exactly do we need to prime and 
which role play individual differences? Why does an effect occur and which underlying 
mechanisms can account for the effects? Does money priming replicate and is the skepticism 
warranted?  
 
Own Research 
I started my research with several conceptual replications of former findings and tested 
whether the effects on helpfulness, just-world-beliefs, immoral behavior, and construal level 
would replicate in my own research. Moreover, throughout these replications we investigated 
which alternative underlying mechanisms could account for the findings. Hence, we assessed 
the motivation to achieve one’s goals as a possible mediating mechanism (see Vohs et al., 
2008) and developed an alternative resource prime to test whether the feeling of abundant 
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resources (see Zhou et al., 2009) would produce the reported effects on helpfulness (Roberts 
& Roberts, 2012). However, our results never replicated the original findings and in the case 
of helpfulness and just-world-beliefs even pointed in some studies significantly in the 
opposite direction. Consequently, we also found no evidence in our studies for the proposed 
underlying mechanisms.  
Thus, we started to look more carefully for possible moderators and interindividual 
differences that could explain our null findings. In our first approach we looked whether 
attitudes towards money, which have been shown to vary considerably between individuals 
(Furnham, Wilson, & Telford, 2012; Tang, 1992; Yamauchi & Templer, 1982) might 
moderate the effects of money priming. People differ in how much meaning and relevance 
they attach to money in their life and thus more positive views towards money could 
plausibly activate different concepts than negative views, when being primed with money. 
Consequently, some first tentative findings indicated that money attitudes might play an 
important role for money priming (Gąsiorowska & Hełka, 2012; Zaleskiewicz et al., 2013). 
However, different attitudes towards money, such as whether money was perceived rather as 
an indicator of success versus an indicator of evil (Tang, 1995) did not moderate the money 
priming effects on the preference for solitary activities (Vohs et al., 2006), unethical 
decisions in a hiring scenario (Kouchaki et al., 2013) or general political attitudes (as 
suggested in: Caruso et al., 2013) in our studies. Moreover, we did once again not find a main 
effect of money priming in these studies.  
 
A Fresh Look: Does Feeling Privileged or Not Make a Difference?  
In our next research project (Schuler & Wänke, 2016, Appendix A), we wanted to 
investigate two questions that might carry the field forward: Which concepts does money 
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trigger and hence which underlying mechanisms drive a particular effect? Which role play 
interindividual differences?  
Caruso et al. (2013) primed participants with the concept of money and found that it 
increases the “endorsement of social systems that legitimize social inequality” (p. 301). More 
specifically, the authors found that money primes increased ratings on four related dependent 
variables (System Justification Scale, Belief in a Just World Scale, Social Dominance 
Orientation Scale, Fair Market Ideology Scale). To explain their findings, they suggested that 
money serves as a symbol for free-market systems and the establishment that upholds it 
(Vohs, 2015). Hence, because money is a symbol of the American system of free-market 
capitalism, money should increase the justification of this system in general and the 
aforementioned related constructs (Caruso et al., 2013). This was a new and unusual 
explanation, given that money could serve as a symbol for many things (e.g., shopping, 
business, success) and therefore the suggested mechanism could predict a wide range of 
effects. More importantly however, we reasoned that this explanation would actually dissent 
with former explanations that money evokes a strict focus on the self and the pursuit of 
personal benefits (see p. 7 for more details), because in line with this reasoning, people 
should evaluate a system according to how well they succeed in it and how much they benefit 
from it. We hypothesized that people who feel disadvantaged by their societal system (e.g., 
because they feel marginalized, unsupported and at the bottom of the hierarchy) should be 
less likely to support it, whereas people who subjectively benefit from the system (e.g., 
because they are privileged and succeed in it) should endorse it. Thus we predicted that one’s 
subjective socioeconomic status (subjective SES), which measures a person’s subjective 
standing in society and has shown to play a vital role in people’s behaviors and cognitions 
(Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015; Demakakos, Nazroo, Breeze, & Marmot, 
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2008; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010) moderates the effect on system 
justification. 
In our Study 1 we conceptually replicated the experiment on system justification by 
Caruso et al. (2013), included a manipulation check and assessed participants subjective SES. 
The results indicated that the prime successfully and reliably activated thoughts of money 
independent of a person’s subjective SES. More importantly, subjective SES moderated the 
effect on system justification, such that only higher subjective SES led to higher system 
justification compared to the control condition.  
In Study 2 we wanted to replicate this finding with a different measure for system 
justification that had been used by Caruso and colleagues as well. With the Belief in a Just 
World Scale, we assessed just-world beliefs, which describe a tendency to perceive the world 
as fair and consequently as legitimate (Jost & Hunyady, 2005). Additionally, we wanted to 
test for an alternative underlying mechanism, which could further emphasis the role of 
interindividual differences for the field. So far, it had not been clear whether money primes 
only activate the concept of money or whether they remind participants of their own or 
alternatively other’s financial possessions. However some research indicated that this 
distinction might play a role and different mechanisms would be activated when participants 
specifically think of others’ or of their own money (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Pfeffer & DeVoe, 
2009). Regarding our study, thinking of other’s money could evoke feelings of injustice, 
increase social comparisons and a tendency to reject the socioeconomic system, while being 
reminded of ones own money could lead to greater self-interest and support for the system. 
We created two priming conditions in which one should remind participants of their own and 
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the other condition of other people’s money.4 The results bolstered the findings of Study 1. 
Higher subjective SES lead to higher and lower subjective SES to lower just-world beliefs, 
both, when subtly reminded of their own and when reminded of other people’s money but not 
(significantly) for participants in the control group. To assess the robustness and the 
reliability of the effect, we conducted a small-scale meta-analysis and included one 
previously unreported study in which the manipulation check indicated a weak manipulation. 
The analysis confirmed our interaction effect.  
   The findings shed some light on the question whether interindividual differences play a 
role for money priming. On the one hand, we found no evidence that it makes a difference 
whether people think of their own or other people’s money, which suggests that it is rather 
important that the concept of money is generally activated. On the other hand, the findings 
indicate that one’s subjective standing in society can alter the effects of money priming. 
Furthermore, considering participants’ subjective SES might also help to explain recent 
replications that raised doubt about the reliability of the effect (Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer et 
al., 2015), because the university samples from the original researchers were presumably 
highly privileged.  
Apart from when the effect occurs, these findings also give some insight on why the 
priming effect occurs. The effect on system justification might be better explained with an 
increased focus on the self rather than Caruso’s symbol for free-markets explanation. 
Furthermore, because subjective SES did not moderate the effect on the manipulation check 
but on system justification, it seems that the prime is not perceived differently but rather 
provokes different behavioral responses. But what implications does this have for the other 
                     
4 As a side note: This manipulation also served to rule out an alternative explanation of our findings on 
subjective SES. One could argue that participants high in SES simply think of their own money, while 
participants low in SES think of other people’s money, which could then drive the effect.  
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findings by Caruso et al. (2013)? I believe, not much. The suggested mechanisms of an 
increased self-focus requires that one can express the need to pursue personal interests and 
benefits in the dependent variable. It is thus unclear whether this mechanism can account for 
the effect on the Social Dominance Scale (e.g., “Some groups of people are simply inferior to 
other groups"; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) or the Fair Market Ideology Scale 
(e.g., "Regulated trade is fair trade"; Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003). Both scales do 
not make clear predictions how to answer in one’s own best interest, because they do not 
specify the role of the participant.5  
Besides providing direct implications for the largely noted articles by Caruso et al. (2013), 
Rohrer et al. (2015), and Klein et al. (2014), the findings also have some broader implications 
for money priming research in general. First, the mental activation of money might not 
necessarily lead to the same behavioral outcomes and judgments for different people. Second, 
it appears crucial to carefully look at the theoretical predictions that drive an effect (and 
maybe examine which other suggested mechanisms could explain an effect as well). Third, 
unexpectedly, we found that the money primes might not always work equally reliable thus 
suggesting that large variations in the strength of the very same manipulation are possible.6  
Maybe because of these implications, maybe because it did „an excellent job of illustrating 
a ‘hidden’ moderator” (J. T. Crawford, personal communication, May 12, 2016), or maybe 
because the findings questioned the evidential value of the failed replications (Klein et al., 
                     
5 It is for example unclear whether participants would perceive themselves as affiliated to the “superior” group 
of Americans versus immigrants or affiliated to the “inferior” group of low versus high social status and whether 
fair trade would be beneficial for the self or not.  
6 In fact, in former studies we also found that different primes (images versus descrambling task) caused 
different effect sizes in the manipulation check, suggesting that the concept of money was not primed equally 
strong along different manipulations. 
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2014; Rohrer et al., 2015), this research has been subject to a large scale replication effort 
itself (Crawford & Fournier, 2017). The replication attempt conceptually replicated the 
findings on system justification but not on belief in a just world, when using a strict inclusion 
criterion for participants. More interestingly, it showed the importance to take a closer look at 
the data of online studies and to exclude participants, who did not work conscientiously at the 
manipulation task.     
 
Do Money Primes Change Political Views?  
The implications of Caruso et al.’s (2013) research seem clear. They showed that money 
primes influence some of the core beliefs of political right-wing orientation and thereby 
suggest that – more generally - money primes “change people’s political views” (Rohrer et 
al., 2015, p. e73). Subsequent replications raised doubt about the reliability of the effects 
(Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer et al., 2015) and their respective suggestion. Moreover, our own 
research (Schuler & Wänke, 2016, Appendix A) and its implications for the underlying 
mechanism (self-focus instead of symbol for free-markets explanation) would open up the 
possibility that Caruso’s findings are a cluster of different effects with different underlying 
mechanisms, not different behavioral expressions of a general endorsement of free-market 
systems. Hence, to us it remained an important research question, whether money primes 
would - beyond changing some underlying right-wing beliefs - indeed change participants’ 
political orientation. In our research, we therefore aimed to thoroughly test whether money 
primes would affect direct measures of political orientation, which reflect a broader range of 
motivational and attitudinal aspects than the previously assessed right-wing beliefs (cf. Jost, 
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). 
To test this hypothesis we adopted a multistudy approach of seven studies with different 
dependent variables of right-wing orientation (Schuler, Ivanov, & Wänke, 2017, Appendix 
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B). Due to possible variations of the strength (i.e., efficacy to activate the proposed concept) 
and the activated concept of the different primes, we held the money prime itself constant. 
We tested two hypotheses and thereby contrasted two possible underlying mechanisms. First, 
we tested for a main effect of money primes on political right-wing orientation, because 
money primes were found to increase underlying right-wing beliefs and values (e.g., Caruso 
et al., 2013; Vohs, 2015). Second, due to our findings on subjective SES, we tested for the 
interaction effect of money x subjective SES, because the suggested self-focus could make 
people shift their political orientation towards a point where they benefit the most from it. In 
other words, people who feel socioeconomically privileged should become more right-wing 
oriented, because right-wing politics, which aim to preserve the social order and which 
criticize social egalitarianism and redistribution (Esping-Andersen, with Gallie, Hemerijck, & 
Myles, 2002; Giddens, 1998; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Roemer, 1998), are more in line with 
their personal interests. On the other hand, people who feel socioeconomically disadvantaged 
should become more left-wing oriented, because left-wing policies aim to minimize social 
differences and to provide financial support to disadvantaged groups (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 
2015).  
As endorsed in more detail in article 3 (Schuler, Vogel, et al., 2017, Appendix C), we 
conducted an internal small-scale meta-analysis to avoid unreliable single analysis of studies 
and to benefit from a maximum of power. The meta-analysis revealed a non-significant main 
effect in the opposite direction. Considering the confidence intervals (Cumming, 2012), our 
findings suggest that the effect of money primes on political orientation is either essentially 
zero or small and in the opposite direction. For our alternative hypothesis that subjective SES 
moderates the effect, we found tentative, marginally significant evidence. Hence, participants 
primed with money tended to report stronger (weaker) right-wing orientation when they felt 
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they had a privileged (disadvantaged) standing in the social hierarchy, compared to 
participants not reminded of money. 
Our goal was to measure general political orientation because we considered the 
hypothesis that money primes change people’s political orientation an important question for 
basic research and for its relevance in real life. From a theoretical perspective, we were able 
to identify and test two conflicting hypotheses for money priming. For those interested in a 
practical perspective of this research, it appears that the menace of money priming for the 
political life is relatively manageable, due to the small effects that we obtained in relatively 
controlled settings.  
More generally, these findings fit nicely in the pattern of our former research and indicate 
that subjective SES is an important variable when it comes to priming people with money. 
However, even though the role of people’s subjective standing in society cannot be 
underestimated in social psychology (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015; Demakakos et al., 2008; 
Keefer, Goode, & Van Berkel, 2015; Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010; Kraus & Stephens, 
2012), I would not predict that it can explain the general unreliability of money priming 
effects or that it affects most money priming findings. Once again, following the general 
suggested mechanism that money primes evoke a focus on the self, it should depend on the 
set of behavioral and possibly even perceptual options (i.e., the dependent variable), whether 
subjective SES moderates the priming effect or not.  
 
What Can We Conclude From Non-Significant Replications? 
The idea that the effects reported by Caruso et al. (2013) might possibly not all reflect the 
same underlying mechanism (see p. 15 f.) led me to look more closely at the replication 
results from Rohrer et al. (2015). Intriguingly, Rohrer’s replication on fair market ideologies 
was not significant but clearly pointed in the same direction (d = 0.14) as the original finding 
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(d = 0.70). Thus, - given that a money priming main effect on the business related items of 
the Fair Market Ideology Scale intuitively seemed not completely preposterous - I began 
wondering how persuasive the evidence by Rohrer and colleagues was.  
I myself had conducted series of conceptual replications, many of which turned out to be 
non-significant. For example in my own findings, only one out of four studies was 
statistically significant (see Schuler, Ivanov, et al., 2017, Appendix B), a pattern that would 
probably lead most researchers to favor a Type-I error explanation (for the significant 
finding). However, a meta-analytic effect with a p-value of .07 would probably guide most 
researchers to more careful interpretations. Hence, more generally I wondered: How strong is 
the evidence of a replication that points in the same direction as the original effect? When 
facing such common patterns of significant and non-significant findings, should we look for 
moderators or should we expect such mixed results? Do sets of non-significant replications 
imply that an effect does not exist?   
These initial thoughts on the replicability of this money priming effect inspired a broader 
methodological report on non-significant replications, their interpretation and their evidential 
value, that burst the limits of mere money priming (Schuler, Vogel, et al., 2017, Appendix C). 
Our goal was to specifically address non-statisticians in social psychology and other fields to 
think about non-significant replications in a non-technical and easily accessible way. More 
specifically, we wanted (a) to raise awareness for a shortsighted interpretation of non-
significant replications among researchers and readers of the psychological literature, (b) 
illustrate the detrimental consequences from exaggerated conclusions in replications to 
discarded research projects, and (c) contrast these common interpretations by showing that 
non-significant replications can also increase the evidence for an effect.  
In a first step, we outlined unwarranted beliefs about non-significant replications. One 
states that “non-significance does provide evidence for a null effect” (confirming the null 
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hypothesis) even though in fact it only shows no significant evidence in favor of an effect 
(rejecting the alternative hypothesis). Another belief states „non-significance questions the 
existence of an effect” although this is not necessarily true when the effect is considered in 
the larger context of other data. We then exemplified the prevalence of such beliefs with 
claims in replication reports and original findings and with own data from German 
Psychology students. In our study we presented participants with scenarios of mixed findings 
(significant and non-significant results) and found that they disregard the possibility of a 
smaller effect and rather conclude that an effect is not real (i.e. null). Such a single-study-
mindset in which participants possibly count significant against non-significant results is 
flawed. If we test ordinal hypotheses, the exact underlying effect size does not really matter, 
thus a non-significant replication indicating a smaller effect would still be in line with the 
hypothesis. More importantly, such a non-significant replication does also neither provide 
evidence for a null-effect nor does it necessarily question the effect. On the contrary, in a 
meta-analytic setting it could even increase the overall evidence for true effect.   
To illustrate this point, we showed in a second step how non-significant replications can 
decrease but also increase the evidence for an effect and therefore do not necessarily provide 
evidence against but also in favor of an effect. Because similar beliefs have been voiced 
about unreported, “file-drawer” studies (Rohrer et al., 2015), we repeated such an analysis for  
unreported “file-drawer” data. To emphasize the relevance of our article for social 
psychology researchers and replicators we used reported replication data (and unreported 
“file-drawer” studies), rather than simulations (see Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014).  
Even though, the message of this report was outlined so far, we wanted to give a complete 
introduction on how to deal with a set of mixed findings. Thus, in a third step we discussed 
different approaches to evaluate – based on the available data and depending on whether one 
trusts the original findings – whether an effect exists or not. Generally, we suggest to 
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consider all available data (either “internal replications” within one research project or 
original and “external” replication studies) in a meta-analytic approach that integrates the 
different effects. Because both original studies and replications studies can be biased and 
replications can represent different underlying effects, we further suggest to use heterogeneity 
analysis to detect for such differences.  
The logic of a cumulative science and the obstacles of interpreting non-significant findings 
are currently discussed in blogs and certain social media groups (e.g., Schimmack, 2016, 
November 23; Simonsohn, 2016, December 17). However, we experienced that the rationale 
that non-significance does not necessarily speak against a hypothesized effect is not yet 
common knowledge (at least within social psychology), and that it still leaves many 
psychologists on conferences somewhat surprised. Hence, this article was not intended as 
another paper on replication or to propose new ways to evaluate the success of a replication, 
but to encourage social psychologists and others to think of Psychology in general and their 
own findings in particular more as a cumulative science, rather than focusing on single p-
values. This would facilitate the view that non-significance is an unreliable indicator for the 
existence or non-existence of an effect and that non-reported studies are a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to demonstrate the non-existence of a previously suggested effect.  
Nowadays researchers might tend to sort replicability contributions in those from crisis-
believers and those from crisis-deniers, who (at one end of the continuum) disagree that any 
problem of replicability or bad research practices exists. When reading our article, one might 
be inclined to quickly put it in the denier’s drawer. But, even though we suggest that non-
significance should not be overrated, this does not mean we want to take that side in this 
debate. On the contrary, to my point of view, questionable research practices such as 
reporting bias, p-hacking, file-drawer biases et cetera are heavily detrimental for our science 
and we need better theorizing (Fiedler, 2014, 2017; Platt, 1964) and better standards for 
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analyses (Vazire, 2016) to improve our science. However, it seems too easy and simply 
unwarranted to question the validity of an effect based on a single or a set of non-significant 
replications, - even with a ceteris paribus assumption that ignores possible moderator 
explanations for the different effects -, without considering the remaining original data or the 
overall evidence of the effect.  
But what are the implications of this contribution for money-priming? Does money 
priming really not replicate or is it all a question of subtle unknown moderators (Cesario & 
Jonas, 2014)? Money priming effects did not reliably replicate in some studies and this could 
be due to subtle moderators or the validity of the effect. Thus, skepticism about the effects is 
certainly warranted. It is however unwarranted to sweepingly conclude that money priming is 
not real at all because some researchers could not replicate the effect, others engaged in p-
hacking or because some original studies were not included in the final report. As shown in 
our research (Schuler & Wänke, 2016, Appendix A), even a set of 23 “failed” replications 
(Klein et al., 2014) can be relatively easy explained when the original study was based on a 
highly selective sample (see Caruso et al., 2013). Hence, we cannot ultimately decide 
whether these money priming effects exist and the debates about the implications of so called 
“failed” replications will continue in both directions (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016; Gilbert, 
King, Pettigrew, & Wilson, 2016; Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011; Simonsohn, 2015; Stroebe & Strack, 2014).  
 
Does Money Evoke a Focus on the Self?  
But how could we investigate the validity of a field (i.e., whether the proposed effects are 
real or not) in a way that would leave less room for speculation about unknown subtle 
moderating factors (Cesario, 2014), the contextual sensitivity of an experiment (Van Bavel, 
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Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016), incapable replicators (Luttrell, Petty, & Xu, in 
press; Schwarz & Strack, 2014), and natural statistical variation of the effect (Schuler, Vogel, 
et al., 2017, Appendix C; Stanley & Spence, 2014)? Some suggest to rely strictly on exact 
replications (Simons, 2014) that may be even conducted only by expert researchers (Bench, 
Rivera, Schlegel, Hicks, & Lench, 2017; Kahneman, 2012) and others propose technically 
advanced “data-inspection systems” that allow to correct for some biases and to detect others 
(Schimmack, 2014; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). Other promising approaches are 
to preregister research (Unkelbach, 2016) in order to avoid possible biases and to increase the 
credibility of the findings in a field or to improve and specify the theoretical concepts to 
create powerful and testable theoretical frameworks for the respective field (Fiedler, 2014, 
2017).  
Our idea to carry the field forward was to (a) look closer at the theoretical mechanisms and 
assess the suggested underlying mechanism (b) with a highly reliable measure in (c) a 
preregistered study (Genschow, Schuler, Cracco, Brass, & Wänke, 2016; Appendix D). The 
way from a manipulation (e.g. the money prime) to the behavioral response (e.g. reduced 
donations to a charitable project) is long and many factors could potentially deteriorate (e.g., 
failed manipulation, reliability of dependent variable) or even cause (confounding variables) 
the effect. Thus, one step closer to a clear picture of the effects of money priming might be to 
assess one of the suggested mediating mechanisms rather than a hypothesized dependent 
variable. Furthermore, we intended to use a highly reliable measure, because a common 
problem in psychology is the use of unreliable (e.g., single-item) measures to assess the 
dependent variable (Epstein, 1980). Especially in priming research, the dependent variable 
often consists of one single behavioral outcome, such as the chosen distance to another 
person or the amount of pencils that were picked up by the participant. Not surprisingly, the 
questionable reliability of these measures is also highly problematic for the replicability of an 
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experiment (Stanley & Spence, 2014). We thus aimed to use a highly valid and reliable 
measure that reduces measurement error. To increase the credibility of our findings among 
money priming skeptics and believers, we aimed for a peer-reviewed, preregistered 
publication that allows to publish the theoretically relevant results regardless of the 
subsequent results.  
As outlined in more detail above, a key assumption of money priming that has been 
described in various articles is that money primes trigger an increased focus on the self and a 
decreased focus on others (Gasiorowska et al., 2012; Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Vohs et al., 
2006, 2008). This “self-focus” on one’s own benefits, goals and needs is the suggested 
mediating mechanism for a great variety of findings (see above; Boucher & Kofos, 2012; 
Chatterjee, Rose, & Sinha, 2013; Yang et al., 2013). We wanted to test this assumption that I 
also used to explain our own findings (Schuler, Ivanov, et al., 2017, Appendix B; Schuler & 
Wänke, 2016, Appendix A) with a reliable task. Hence, the inhibition of imitation measure 
(Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000), which we borrowed from cognitive 
psychology and which shows high reliability due to its repeated trials seemed like a highly 
suitable measure to assess self-focus. In the task, participants have to respond to a visual 
stimulus (a letter) by raising either their index or their middle finger, while a hand on the 
screen performs either a congruent or incongruent movement. In the incongruent condition, 
the observed movement interferes with the instructed movement and therefore has to be 
inhibited. Research has shown, that the greater the self-focus of a person the less the person 
mimics others and the smaller the interference with one’s own reaction (see Genschow et al., 
2016; Appendix D). In other words, while the common effect in such a task is that 
participants react faster in congruent trials than in incongruent trials (interference effect), the 
effect is reduced the stronger participants focus on the self. 
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We conducted a pilot study with a 2 (incongruent vs. congruent) x 2 (control vs. money) 
within-subject design in which the displayed hand that had to be ignored was grounded on a 
grey surface (control condition) or a surface full of money bills (money condition). Our 
results supported the self-focus hypothesis and showed a significant interaction effect on the 
latencies indicating smaller interference effects in the money condition. However, in our 
preregistered study, we want to change one aspect in order to rule out an alternative 
explanation. Because the money bill surface might have grasped participants’ attention, we 
plan to use a similarly “distracting” surface as in the money priming condition.7  
The lack of theoretical rigor possibly led to the field’s current state in which it is unclear 
which mechanisms and which effects are real. Most of the suggested mechanisms on money 
priming appear more as post-hoc explanations for obtained findings rather than theoretically 
derived predictions. Moreover, many of the explanations resemble surrogates (Gigerenzer, 
1998), this is “one-word explanations” (p. 2) such as self-sufficiency and “rediscriptions” (p. 
3) such as priming makes the concept of money salient rather than specified theories with 
precise predictions. Therefore, we considered it more important to test one of the suggested 
theoretical mechanisms even though the proposed theory makes only few testable predictions 
(see Vohs et al., 2008) rather than to search for new priming effects. That priming 
participants with money increases their self-focus is such a testable prediction, albeit it is 
only a subfacet of the proposed underlying process that comes along with the activation of 
the psychological concept of money.  
Of course, our paradigm does not completely rule out all alternative possible mechanisms. 
As one example, money priming is supposed to lead to increased performance (Boucher & 
                     
7 Even though this is unlikely, because if the money-surface distracted people from the letter (i.e., the visual 
stimulus), we would have found greater latencies in the money condition in congruent and incongruent trials 
(i.e., a main effect). However, this was not the case. 
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Kofos, 2012). However, in this case we would expect a main effect of the money condition 
indicating smaller latencies and better performance in incongruent and congruent trials. But, 
one could also think of other possible mechanisms. For example (not as a theoretically 
grounded but a fairly hypothetical possibility), the primes could evoke feelings of loss or 
thoughts about not having as much money, which in turn would lead to rumination and less 
imitation (Muller, 2017). This would then produce similar behavioral reactions on the task as 
the hypothesized interaction effect. Be that as it may, the characteristics of this paradigm as 
being unobtrusive, highly reliable, and less susceptible to contextual influences will help to 
narrow down possible conclusions that can be drawn from this study. Hence, this 
preregistered study might be a first step to decrease the range of possibilities and open 
questions regarding the psychological mechanisms of money priming.  
 
General Discussion 
Caruso and colleagues’ research (2013) left many open questions and skepticism about 
their findings, some of which could be tackled in this research. It appears that the findings 
from Caruso and colleagues are unreliable and difficult to replicate (Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer 
et al., 2015; Vadillo et al., 2016). First of all, this might be due to the possibility that Caruso’s 
findings are a cluster of different effects with different underlying mechanisms that are only 
ostensibly related. This alone however would not explain a lack of replicability. But if the 
findings - or one part of them - are a mix of Type-I errors and questionable research practices 
that altogether give the impression of a reliable effect, this would be one suggested possibility 
(Rohrer et al., 2015). Another possibility is that the use of selective samples (see also Vohs, 
2015) and the existence of moderators that can set off or even reverse an effect are 
responsible for the variation of one or more of the reported effects. Lastly, an unreliable 
activation of the concept of money (i.e., a failure to consistently prime money) could 
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potentially explain some of the non-significant (and especially some of the online-) 
replications.  
Our research sheds some light on these possibilities. We found in our research that two of 
these effects (increased system justification & just-world-beliefs) are moderated by subjective 
SES (Schuler & Wänke, 2016, Appendix A). Participants with a higher subjective SES tend 
to justify the existing socioeconomic system in the United States more strongly and to believe 
more in the justness of its social outcomes, when being reminded of money. Participants with 
a lower subjective SES tend to reject the socioeconomic system and to question the justness 
of its social outcomes more strongly, when being primed with money. We also found first 
signs that the money descrambling task works unreliable in online studies and that 
corresponds with some of our unpublished findings, where we found considerable differences 
of the amount of money words created in the manipulation check between different priming 
manipulations (images versus descrambling task). Thus, the role of subjective SES, selective 
sampling by Caruso and the unreliable activation of the concept might explain some of the 
unsuccessful replications. 
As an answer to the question whether money primes can change political orientation in 
general – as implied by Eugene Caruso -, we investigated in a multi-study approach and with 
direct measures of political orientation the effects of money primes (Schuler, Ivanov, et al., 
2017, Appendix B). We found no main effect of money primes and a tendency for an 
interaction effect with subjective SES. In other words, it appears that among our German 
participants, money priming does not generally affect political views but only as a function of 
subjective SES. Thus, our data - at least partly - limits and specifies the implications given by 
the research of Caruso and colleagues.  
Furthermore, we showed that the mentioned “file-drawer” studies by Caruso et al. (Rohrer 
et al., 2015) should cause no skepticism about the effect itself (Schuler, Vogel, et al., 2017, 
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Appendix C). The studies increased the overall evidence for a smaller but true effect. Once 
again, it does not follow that the effect on fair-market ideologies is real and that a meta-
analysis across all existing findings from Caruso and others would lead to a supportive result 
for the effect; but it questions the conclusions that the effect on fair-market ideologies 
(assuming separate independent effects, not one common effect on system-justifying 
ideologies) can be explained away as being Type-I errors.  
More generally, this research has three important implications for the field. First, it seems 
that the suggested self-focus mechanism for money primes has some validity, because it can 
explain a comparably complex interaction pattern across several studies (Schuler, Ivanov, et 
al., 2017, Appendix B; Schuler & Wänke, 2016, Appendix A) and some preliminary evidence 
bolsters the assumption of a self-focus (Genschow et al., 2016, Appendix D, Pilot Study). 
Second, we showed that money primes can be moderated by subjective SES but we found no 
evidence for a subcategory of money primes (i.e., “my” versus “other’s” money). Third, the 
primes may not reliably activate thoughts of money. Thus, this research suggests some 
explanatory factors, why money priming seems so hard to replicate in general.  
Speaking about replications and research in experimental and social psychology in 
general, our contribution on non-significant findings (Schuler, Vogel, et al., 2017, Appendix 
C) hopefully provides new insights and maybe even a new perspective for researchers and 
students in social psychology and other fields. In times of a crisis of confidence in 
psychology and especially in social psychology, many new replications providing non-
significant results are emerging on a monthly basis. Furthermore, journals increasingly 
require higher power and sets of conceptual replications instead of single-study papers 
(Vazire, 2016). Thus, to my view it is more than ever of vital importance to acquire a 
coherent and proper understanding of non-significance in general (cf. Cohen, 1994) and of 
the meaning and the implications of non-significant replications in particular. Because we felt 
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that some of these old statistical truisms regarding non-significance are forgotten or maybe 
not fully ingrained among all researchers anymore, our methodological contribution was 
intended to fill this gap and raise awareness for an apparently often shortsighted 
understanding of the evidential value of single replications. I hope it will ultimately lead 
more researchers in the field to think of their own studies as a set of cumulative evidence that 
leads to the inclusion of non-significant studies and consequently less file-drawer biases and 
less biased effect sizes for replications.  
During the course of this research it was still not clear, whether and how it would be 
feasible to include non-significant studies into a publishable manuscript. We tried, discussed 
it with the editor, reviewers, and colleagues and ultimately found a way to mention and 
describe our non-significant, “failed” study in the manuscript along with the significant 
findings without diluting from the story of the manuscript (Schuler & Wänke, 2016, 
Appendix A). Hence, maybe the two examples we provided on how to include non-
significant findings in a manuscript (Schuler, Ivanov, et al., 2017, Appendix B; Schuler & 
Wänke, 2016, Appendix A) will help our plea to think, test, and report more meta-
analytically. 
 
Closing Remarks 
One might argue that instead of discovering new money effects or testing certain proposed 
underlying mechanisms, I could have focused on alternative explanations for the effects and 
test them. Indeed, one could imagine other possible mechanisms, such that money primes are 
simple goal primes or reminders of hidden incentives. Furthermore, money primes could be a 
certain type of power prime, resource prime or business prime rather than evoking an 
independent priming concept. Maybe future research will lead to some new insights in this 
regard. Because it would have been difficult to demonstrate such alternative accounts, when 
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one cannot replicate any of the former findings properly and because there was an increasing 
skepticism about the findings of money priming in general, I focused in my research on the 
assumptions made in the literature and on moderating factors. Proposing even more 
alternative mechanisms would have, to my point of view, not help to advance the field. 
The omnipresent use and propagation of meta-analyses is evident in this work. I did not 
further elaborate on the use and logic of cumulative and small-scale meta-analysis in this 
synopsis because meta-analysis is only a promising tool to solve statistical problems and to 
arrive at better conclusions. As a social psychologist, the topic of this research was money, 
self-focus, politics and the implications of non-significant replications (which appear to occur 
quite often in money priming), not a statistical method. However, some final words might be 
appropriate at this point. Small-scale meta-analysis describes the application of a meta-
analysis with very few studies (from two up to 20) while a cumulative meta-analysis 
describes the approach to include a new study (i.e., a conceptual replication) into the meta-
analysis of former findings and then see how this new study changes the implications of the 
data. To learn more about the statistical approach, random-effects analysis, and 
heterogeneity, the interested reader might read the respective introduction passages on meta-
analysis in the appendices A to C or Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009) as a 
non-technical introduction to the topic.  
Recent publications that received considerable attention, propagate the use of meta-
analysis for small sets of studies (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016; Stanley & Spence, 2014) or in a 
cumulative approach (Braver et al., 2014; Cumming, 2014) to decrease the confidence 
interval and to obtain more reliable results. However, some researchers have criticized the 
use of small-scale meta-analysis, because they could lead to Type-I error inflation and “meta-
hacking” (Sakaluk, 2016; Ueno, Fastrich, & Murayama, 2016), be biased due to the inclusion 
of biased original studies (Sakaluk, 2016) and because it does not substitute for 
MONEY,	SELF-FOCUS,	AND	POLITICS	 	
	
	32 
preregistration (Van Elk et al., 2015). In light of many replications, a great plethora of 
findings in the field and strong variations in the obtained effect sizes, a meta-analytic 
approach seemed most promising, even though other approaches to investigate the reliability 
of an effect or to replicate an original finding also have their benefits (Open Science 
Collaboration, 2015; Simonsohn, 2015; Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).  
 
Conclusions 
While the last eleven years have revealed a confusing wealth of money priming findings, 
few researchers have focused on the mechanisms and moderating factors that produce these 
effects. The current research aimed to deal with these issues and provides a somewhat 
brighter outlook on the psychological processes behind money priming. Furthermore, our 
theoretical report also provides some implications for other fields on dealing with non-
significant findings. Therein our research might offer a new perspective for social 
psychologists on their own findings and possibly stimulates more sustainable research in 
money priming that ultimately builds up to a solid theoretical framework that will revive the 
field. 
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Abstract 
 
Two studies demonstrated that subjective socioeconomic status (SES) moderates the effects 
of reminders of money on the endorsement of the socioeconomic system (see Caruso et al., 
2013). Whether reminders of money increased or decreased system justification (Study 1) 
and the belief in a just world (Study 2) depended on participants’ subjectively experienced 
standing in the social hierarchy. These findings were backed up by a small-scale meta-
analysis across our entire data (N = 365). Hence, we also included a third study into the meta-
analysis, in which the manipulation check indicated that the mental activation of money was 
comparably weak. This research offers new insights into the psychological mechanisms of 
money primes and reveals that interindividual differences, such as whether one feels 
privileged or not, can moderate the effects of money primes.  
 
Keywords: money, priming, socioeconomic status, meta-analysis, reproducibility 
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Introduction 
Money plays an important role in our lives. Researchers have shown that, to some 
extent, personal wealth affects one’s happiness (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Dunn, Aknin, & 
Norton, 2008), health and longevity (Fiscella & Franks, 1997; Mackenbach et al., 2005), and 
the ability to experience positive emotions (Quoidbach, Dunn, Petrides, & Mikolajczak, 
2010). Moreover, besides having money, research in the last few years has revealed that even 
thinking about money can have tremendous effects on people’s behavior and attitudes (Vohs, 
Mead, & Goode, 2006). Overall it seems that people who are subtly reminded of money 
“behave as if they can do just fine without others” (Lasaleta, Sedikides, & Vohs, 2014, p. 
714). They tend to care less about others and focus more on their own personal needs and 
goals (Vohs et al., 2006; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). Findings that being reminded of 
money made people more accepting of social inequality (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 
2013) would fit this general tendency. Caruso and colleagues (2013) claim that money serves 
as a symbol (i.e., as a reminder) of free-market capitalism and should lead people to endorse 
such free-market systems and more generally the existing free-market system in the United 
States. Accordingly, these authors found higher scores on the System Justification Scale (Kay 
& Jost, 2003) and the Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) among US-
participants who had been reminded of money.  
In the present paper we take another look at the theoretical assumptions that 
stimulated this research and derive more differentiated hypotheses. In this respect it may be 
interesting to note that other studies could not replicate the original findings (Klein et al., 
2014; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015). Indeed, according to our reasoning, the effect may 
strongly vary depending on participants.  
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The present research 
An established finding of money priming is that reminders of money lead to a focus 
on the self and one’s personal advantages (see: Vohs, 2015). Money reminded participants 
exert more effort on their current tasks (e.g., Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Mogilner, 2010) and 
are more concerned with their own compared to others’ benefits (Gąsiorowska & Hełka, 
2012; Reutner & Wänke, 2013). They are also more likely to behave unethically in order to 
achieve money or other goals (Gino & Mogilner, 2014; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & 
Sousa, 2013). In summary, while neglecting others’ interests, it appears that money evokes a 
bias for personal concerns and self-interest (Gino & Pierce, 2009; Kouchaki et al., 2013; 
Vohs et al., 2006, 2008).  
Thus, when money motivates to pursue personal benefits, one should be more likely 
to evaluate a system according to the extent it serves one’s personal needs. In other words, 
those who think they profit from the existing socioeconomic system should be more likely to 
approve of it when reminded of money. Accordingly, those who feel less advantaged by the 
existing system should be less likely to support it when reminded of money. 
Socioeconomically unprivileged people face tougher challenges (Dohrenwend, 1973; 
Johnson & Krueger, 2006) and have fewer coping resources (McLeod & Kessler, 1990) than 
their more advantaged counterparts. More importantly, people with a better education, more 
money and better jobs benefit from free-market systems, whereas people with less education 
and money suffer from them compared to more egalitarian systems (Esping-Andersen, with 
Gallie, Hemerijck, & Myles, 2002).  
We would therefore predict that whether reminders of money lead to higher 
endorsement of the US socioeconomic system depends on who is asked. We expect that an 
individual’s perceived standing in the social hierarchy (i.e., subjective socioeconomic status, 
subjective SES) moderates the effect of money on the justification of the prevailing 
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socioeconomic system. Because reminders of money cause people to evaluate a system 
according to how well they are doing in it, individuals who see themselves as 
socioeconomically disadvantaged should be less inclined to justify the existing system. On 
the contrary, people who would view themselves more as the beneficiaries of the 
socioeconomic system should endorse the system after being reminded of money. 
Even though indicators of an individual’s objective socioeconomic status form the 
basis of one’s subjective SES (Demakakos, Nazroo, Breeze, & Marmot, 2008), they capture 
different conceptual dimensions (Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015; 
Demakakos et al., 2008; Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). We emphasize that it is 
the subjective experience of one’s standing in the social hierarchy that influences feelings of 
being privileged or disadvantaged.  
We conceptually replicated two experiments by Caruso and colleagues (2013), and 
assessed system justification as a function of money priming. Critically, different from the 
original studies, we used a broader sample in terms of its socioeconomic background and 
assessed participants’ subjective SES.   
 
Study 1 
Method  
Design and participants. We measured subjective SES for half of the participants 
before the manipulation and for the other half after the dependent variable. Thereby we 
controlled for possible influences of the money prime on participant’s subjective SES 
reported after the dependent variable as well as for a potential priming of money due to the 
assessment of subjective SES before the manipulation. This resulted in a 2 (Prime: money vs. 
control) x 2 (SES-order: before vs. after) design with subjective SES measured on a 10-point 
scale.  
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Participants were recruited through the online platform CrowdFlower. We 
predetermined our sample size with 130 (plus 20 participants buffer for possible dropout due 
to online recruitment) to arrive at a power of 1-β > .80 assuming a small to medium 
interaction effect (f2 = 0.0625; alpha = .05; 2-tailed). From 150 participants, four left no data 
and data from another 22 participants were excluded because they did not follow the 
instructions to create four-word phrases in the manipulation. The remaining 124 participants 
(62 males, 1 other) were on average 38 years old (SD = 12.92), 60.5% had a household 
income of less than $50,000 per year, and 58.5% did not graduate from college. We 
exclusively recruited US-American participants in order to ensure the effectiveness of the 
semantic prime and due to the “America-centric version of the System Justification Scale” 
(Caruso et al., 2013, p. 304). 
  
Materials and procedure. Participants accessed the study online and proceeded to a 
word-descrambling task, which consisted of forming a grammatically correct four-word 
phrase out of five scrambled words. The money condition contained 15 money-related 
phrases (e.g., “one hundred dollar bill”) and 15 control phrases (see Appendix A; Vohs et al., 
2006). Next, to measure the cognitive activation of money, participants worked on a word 
stem completion task in which they had to complete 15 word stems, seven of which could be 
completed as money-related or neutral words (e.g., “ri-“ as rich, rise or ride; see Appendix C; 
Vohs et al., 2006). Then participants completed the eight-item System Justification Scale 
(e.g., “American society needs to be radically restructured”; reverse coded; α =.78; Kay & 
Jost, 2003), as adapted by Caruso et al. (2013; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). 
Finally, participants reported demographic variables including measures for household 
income (Piff et al., 2010), political ideology and religiosity.  
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To assess a person’s subjective SES, participants completed an online version of the 
MacArthur Scale of subjective SES (Piff et al., 2010). Participants were instructed to imagine 
an image of a 10-rung ladder as representing where people stand in the United States, 
whereby the top rung represents the highest standing in the social hierarchy. Then individuals 
indicated on a 10-point scale where they see themselves on this ladder relative to others (M = 
5.66, SD = 1.98; r (household income) = .29).  
 
Results and Discussion 
A t-test revealed that money-reminded participants created significantly more money 
words (n = 58, M = 1.31, SD = 0.96) than when not reminded of money (n= 66, M = 0.77, SD 
= 0.78), t(122) = 3.44, p < .001, d = 0.62, 95% confidence interval (CI) = [0.26, 0.98]. This 
effect was similar to previous studies using this method (Vohs et al., 2006) and not 
moderated by subjective SES, b = 0.02, t(120) = 0.44, p = .66, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.10].  
To test our moderation hypothesis, we regressed system justification on the prime (-1 
= control, 1 = money; mean-centered1), subjective SES (1 – 10; mean-centered), SES-order (-
1 = before manipulation, 1 = after dependent variable; mean-centered) and all interaction 
terms. For participants with an average value in subjective SES, the money prime (M = 4.03, 
SD = 1.11) did not lead to stronger system justification than in the control condition (M = 
3.94, SD = 0.88), b = 0.05, t(116) = 0.56, p = .58, 95% CI = [-0.12, 0.22]. Subjective SES 
significantly affected participants’ system justification, b = 0.14, t(116) = 3.26, p = .002, 95% 
CI = [0.06, 0.23] with people higher in subjective SES reporting higher system justification. 
More importantly, the expected interaction of money and subjective SES significantly 
predicted system justification, b = 0.11, t(116) = 2.46, p = .02, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.19], f2 = 
                     
1 As suggested by Hayes (2013), contrast variables throughout all studies were mean centered to provide 
estimates of the weighted average effects at the sample mean level of all other variables.       
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.05, [0, 0.12].2 3 This interaction was not affected by SES-order. Neither the three-way 
interaction, b = -0.03, t(116) = 0.68, p = .50, 95% CI = [-0.12, 0.06], nor the two-way 
interactions SES-order x Prime, b = 0.14, t(116) = 1.64, p = .11, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.31], SES-
order x Subjective SES, b = 0.02, t(116) = 0.51, p = .61, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.11], or the effect 
of SES-order were significant, b = 0.01, t(116) = 0.09, p = .93, 95% CI = [-0.16, 0.18]. 
Collapsing over SES-order, simple slope analysis (Hayes, 2013) revealed a small but not 
significant effect of subjective SES on system justification in the control condition, b = 0.06, 
t(120) = 0.90, p = .37, 95% CI = [-0.07, 0.19]. However, as shown in Figure 1, higher 
subjective SES led to an increase in system justification in the money condition, b = 0.25, 
t(120) = 4.52, p < .001, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.36]. In summary, whether reminders of money 
increased system justification depended on where people see themselves in the system. 
Whether subjective SES was assessed before the manipulation or after the dependent variable 
did not affect these results significantly. Moreover, the mental activation of money due to the 
money prime did not vary significantly across different levels of subjective SES.   
 
                     
2 Controlling for religiosity (only in Study 1), age, gender, political ideology, and household income (see Caruso 
et al., 2013) did not significantly alter the results in both studies. The reported confidence intervals for f-square 
are 95% one-sided, because f-square effect sizes cannot be negative.  
3 When applying a more liberal dropout criterion that comprised outliers who interrupted the study (n = 7; 
>=19.1 min, i.e. upper quartile + 1.5 interquartile range) and non-native speakers (6), the interaction remained 
significant, b = 0.11, t(103) = 2.29, p = .02, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.20]. 
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Figure 1. Estimated System Justification scores by condition (control vs. money) for lower (1 SD below the 
mean) and higher (1 SD above the mean) subjective socioeconomic status (SES; 1 - 10) collapsed over SES-
order (before manipulation vs. after dependent variable).  
 
Study 2 
We conducted another study to broaden our findings by using a different measure 
(Belief in a Just World Scale; Rubin & Peplau, 1975), which had also been shown to be 
sensitive to money priming (Caruso et al., 2013; Study 2). The belief in a just world (BJW) 
describes a tendency to rationalize the status quo by blaming victims for their fate (Jost, 
Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003). As such BJW is thought to be a system-justifying 
ideology to legitimize the current system (e.g., Jost & Hunyady, 2005) and the Belief in a Just 
World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) is used as a measure for general system justification 
(e.g., Jost & Burgess, 2000; Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2007). 
 Again we predicted that being reminded of money should increase approval and 
belief in the system for those who are doing well in the system, but less so for those who are 
less privileged. For exploratory reasons, we also tested whether thoughts of one’s own versus 
other people’s money would lead to different effects. On the one hand, one might assume that 
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thinking about one’s own money might possibly be more effective in inducing self-interest 
than thinking about other’s money. This would suggest that participants’ subjective SES 
affects their endorsement of the US-American system more, if they were reminded of their 
own rather than others’ money. On the other hand, thoughts about other people’s money 
might evoke greater subjective comparisons with others and thereby induce similar or greater 
effects with regard to just-world beliefs.  
 
Method  
Participants and design. In addition to a control group, two money prime groups 
were run in order to realize the different perspectives (my-money vs. their-money). Similar to 
Study 1, we predetermined our sample size with 150 (including 20 participants buffer) to 
arrive at a Power of 1-β > .80. From the initial CrowdFlower sample of 150 US-American 
participants, nine left no data and data from 23 participants were excluded because they did 
not produce four-word phrases in the descrambling task. The remaining 118 participants (40 
males, 2 other) were on average 40 years old (SD = 14.03), 51% had a household income of 
less than $50.000 per year, and 65% did not graduate from college.  
 
Materials and procedure. Analogous to Study 1, participants accessed the study 
online and completed a modified version of the same descrambling task. Different from 
Study 1, we varied all personal pronouns in the 15 money-related phrases in order to evoke 
thoughts of one’s own money in the my-money condition (e.g., “I received a raise”) and to 
evoke thoughts of others’ money in the their-money condition (e.g., “She received a raise”; 
see Appendix B). In other words, whereas the money-related phrases in Study 1 contained 
mixed or no personal pronouns (e.g., “I”, “we”, “their”, “he”), money-related phrases in the 
my-money condition contained only self-related (e.g., “I”, “our”, “my”) and money-related 
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phrases in the their-money condition contained only other-related (e.g., “he”, “her”, “their”) 
personal pronouns. Afterwards participants completed the 20-item Belief in a Just World 
Scale (e.g., "It is rare for an innocent to be wrongly sent to jail"; α = .75; Rubin & Peplau, 
1975) as an adapted version by Caruso et al. (2013; 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree). Finally, participants reported their subjective SES (M = 5.73, SD = 2.06; r (household 
income) = .48) and demographic variables similar to Study 1. 
 
Results and Discussion 
We used two orthogonal-contrasts in a regression analysis. The first contrasted both 
“my” and “their” money groups versus the control group (0.5, 0.5, -1; mean-centered) to test 
for a general money effect. The second contrasted “my” versus “their” money (-1, 1, control 
= 0; mean-centered) to test for differences between being reminded of one’s own versus 
others’ money. We further included the mean-centered subjective SES and both interaction 
terms.  
Both contrasts did not reveal significant differences between conditions at the mean 
level of subjective SES. Participants in the money conditions (M = 3.99, SD = 0.68) did not 
report stronger just-world beliefs than in the control condition (M = 4.05, SD = 0.66), b = 
0.02, t(112) = 0.28, p = .78, 95% CI = [-0.14, 0.19]. Furthermore, whether participants were 
primed with their own money (my-money-condition; M = 3.92, SD = 0.70) compared to other 
people’s money (their-money-condition; M = 4.07, SD = 0.67) did not alter the results 
between groups, b = -0.04, t(112) = 0.55, p = .58, 95% CI = [-0.19, 0.11]. However, higher 
subjective SES significantly led to stronger BJW, b = 0.12, t(112) = 4.12, p < .001, 95% CI = 
[0.06, 0.18].  
As shown in Figure 2, subjective SES moderated the general money effect on just-
world beliefs: Even though significance did not quite reach conventional levels, the first 
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interaction revealed that the effect of subjective SES was stronger in the money conditions 
compared to the control condition, b = 0.08, t(112) = 1.87, p = .06, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.15], f2 
= .03, [0, 0.08], while the second interaction showed that the two money conditions did not 
differ significantly, b = 0.02, t(112) = 0.46, p = .65, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.09].4  
Simple slope analysis revealed that the higher participants’ subjective SES the more 
they believed in a just world, both when reminded of their own money, b = 0.18, t(112) = 
3.23, p = .002, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.29], as well as when reminded of other people’s money, b = 
0.14, t(112) = 2.95, p = .004, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.24]. Whereas in the control condition 
participants’ subjective SES did not significantly affect their just-world beliefs, b = 0.05, 
t(112) = 0.99, p = .32, 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.14]. Hence, similar to Study 1, subjective SES 
marginally moderated the effect of money on the endorsement of the current system. Whether 
the prime activated thoughts of “my” or “their” money did not substantially alter the results. 
This implies that both manipulations evoked similar tendencies to act in accordance with 
one’s self-interest. 
 
                     
4 When applying a more liberal dropout criterion that comprised participants who interrupted the study (n = 4; 
>= 22.0 min, i.e. upper quartile + 1.5 interquartile range) and non-native speakers (2) the first interaction was 
significant , b = 0.09, t(106) = 2.15, p = .03, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.18].  
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Figure 2. Estimated Belief in a Just World scores by condition (Control vs. My Money vs. Their Money) for 
lower (1 SD below the mean) and higher (1 SD above the mean) subjective socioeconomic status (SES; 1 - 10).  
 
Meta-Analysis 
We conducted a small-scale meta-analysis (Cumming, 2012) to assess the robustness 
of the interaction effect of money and subjective SES on system justification. In a meta-
analysis, the pooled estimate g is a far more trustworthy indicator for the true effect, since it 
is based on the entirety of the data (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014). Hence, we also 
included a third study, which was equivalent with Study 1 but with the Belief in a Just World 
Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) as a dependent variable (Appendix D for details). We do not 
report that study individually in this paper, because the manipulation check indicated a 
comparably small effect of the manipulation (d = .32, 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.68], t(121) = 1.77, p 
= .08; see Study 1: d = .62). Presumably due to the less powerful manipulation, the 
interaction between money and subjective SES on BJW was not significant, b = 0.05, t(114) 
= 0.92, p = .36, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.16], f2 = .01, [0, 0.03]. Even though the premises to find 
the expected interaction in this study were probably not equivalent, we nevertheless decided 
to incorporate the data to follow Braver et al.’s (2014) logic of cumulating evidence. 
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According to this logic, a meta-analysis should include all studies because a greater sample 
size provides a better indicator of the true effect than each study by itself.  
To calculate the effect size for the interaction effects, we computed f-square of the 
interaction terms from the three studies and converted them into Hedges’ g as an unbiased 
estimate of the population effect size (Cumming, 2012, pp. 281-320 ). By using a weighted 
random-effects model, each experiment was weighted depending on the variance of its effect 
size. Moreover, this procedure enables to test, whether the discovered interaction effects in 
our studies were heterogeneous. Q, as a measure for heterogeneity, therefore indicates 
whether the effects obtained across the studies differ due to sampling variability of the same 
underlying effect or whether the studies are based on heterogeneous effect sizes (Borenstein, 
Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). 
Our meta-analysis revealed that, across all three experiments the interaction effect 
was significant, g = 0.32, p = 0.002, 95% CI [0.11, 0.53]. Thus, although the manipulation in 
our third study was presumably too weak to cause a significant interaction effect with 
subjective SES, data of all three studies provide cumulative evidence for the interaction effect 
in the meta-analysis (see Braver et al., 2014). The effect was not heterogeneous across the 
three experiments, Q (df = 2) = 1.27, p = 0.53. This suggests, that we found similar effects 
across our three studies or, according to Braver et al. (2014), that the predicted interaction 
effect replicated across three studies.  
Even though this meta-analysis across 365 participants provides substantial evidence 
for the predicted interaction, the inclusion of our third study remains debatable. One might 
argue, that due to the non-significant manipulation check, we cannot confirm that thoughts of 
money had been reliably activated in the money condition. This dichotomous logic implies 
that Study 3 should be excluded from our analysis. A meta-analysis that consisted only of 
Study 1 and 2 (N = 242), still revealed a significant interaction effect, g = 0.41, p = 0.002, 
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95% CI [0.15, 0.66]. The variability of the effect size was not significant, Q (df = 1) = 0.16, p 
= 0.69. 
 
General Discussion 
Two experiments showed that participants’ subjective SES moderates the effect of 
money reminders on the endorsement of the current socioeconomic system. When being 
reminded of money, participants with higher subjective SES tended to justify the existing 
socioeconomic system in the United States more strongly and believed more in the justness of 
its social outcomes than participants with lower subjective SES. A small-scale meta-analysis 
that included three experiments confirmed the general effect on the endorsement of the 
socioeconomic system and indicated no significant heterogeneity in the obtained effects.  
We suggest that money cues do not generally lead to an increased approval of the 
current socioeconomic system, but mainly for those who profit from the respective system. 
Three reasons may contribute to this. First, being reminded of money might make the 
economic aspects of a system more salient and more accessible as a base for the judgment. 
Second, thinking of money causes participants to more strongly focus on their own personal 
advantage (e.g., Gino & Mogilner, 2014; Kouchaki et al., 2013; Reutner & Wänke, 2013). 
Third, reminders of money lead to a focus on the self and should therefore make system 
justification less likely when it conflicts with self-interest (Jost et al., 2003).  As a result, 
money-reminded participants base their judgments about the social and economic system 
more strongly on whether they benefit from this system or not. Those who do well in the 
system will show increased support and increased belief in its fairness whereas those who 
sense that they have fallen behind will have a more critical view of the justness and 
legitimacy of the current system.  
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Although our results show consistently that subjective SES moderates the effect of 
money priming on the endorsement of the socioeconomic system, the correlational nature of 
the data pose a potential limitation. Only a manipulation of subjective SES, without 
activating the concept of money, would allow conclusive causal assumptions. A second 
shortcoming of this research is that we did not vary the type of money prime. Even though, 
the money scrambled sentence task is consistently used in the money priming literature (e.g., 
Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Caruso et al., 2013; Hansen, Kutzner, & Wänke, 2013; Jiang, Chen, 
& Wyer Jr, 2014; Kouchaki et al., 2013; Vohs et al., 2006), we cannot rule out the possibility, 
that the task activates alternative concepts such as economic inequalities. If so, then large 
parts of the research on money would be confounded with the activation of economic 
inequalities, which in turn would be possibly moderated by subjective SES. However, we 
find this to be unlikely. Assessing subjective SES before the manipulation (as in one 
condition of Study 1), should have activated thoughts of economic inequalities even in the 
control condition and therefore offset any effect of the descrambling task. This was not the 
case; we also found the interaction effect when we only considered those participants who 
reported their subjective SES before the manipulation, b = 0.14, t(57) = 2.20, p = .03, 95% CI 
= [0.01, 0.26]. 
It is also worth noting, that while corroborating studies that show effects of self-
interest (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015), our results seem to be at odds with some findings on 
system justification theory in which economically disadvantaged groups would be (at least 
moderately) more motivated to justify the socioeconomic system (see: Hunt, 2000; Jost et al., 
2003). In our studies however, participants’ subjective SES in the control condition was 
slightly positive related to system justification (r = .12) and BJW (r = .15), which established 
a rather conservative test for our moderation hypothesis. This positive relationship is not 
surprising, since an inverse relationship between SES and system justification depends on 
Running head: A FRESH LOOK ON MONEY PRIMING  
	
20	
many boundary conditions (Kay & Friesen, 2011) and is more likely when measured with 
unobtrusive measures that are embedded in large surveys (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; 
Jost et al., 2003) and when motives of self-interest are not salient (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 
2004; Jost et al., 2003). In our studies system justification was assessed with explicit 
measures that were not embedded in other items. Consequently, Jost et al. (2004, p. 910) 
argue, it would be unwarranted to claim “that members of disadvantaged groups will always 
or even typically exhibit stronger support for the system than will members of advantaged 
groups”. 
Besides proposing a fresh look on money priming by suggesting that the effects may 
differ substantially depending on who is primed, as a side effect, our findings also offer 
conceptual implications for the recent debates about the replicability of money priming and 
perhaps priming in general (e. g. Asendorpf et al., 2013; Cesario, 2014; Locke, 2015). On the 
one hand, looking at the overall pattern, the present research further shows that the findings 
from Caruso and colleagues (2013) are difficult to replicate (see: Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer et 
al., 2015). On the other hand our research identified a moderator that may account for the 
effect found by Caruso et al. (2013, Study 1 & 2) if we assume that their participants were of 
relatively high subjective SES (students of an elite US university with renowned prestige, 
education and excellent job perspectives) compared to the replication samples. Note however, 
that such tentative conclusions are only based on three conceptual replications and an 
educated guess about the subjective social standing of Caruso et al.’s participants. On a 
different note we also point to the variance in our manipulation checks, which suggests that 
procedures of priming money may not reliably activate thoughts of money. The robustness of 
the priming procedure is however different from the robustness of the effects given the prime 
works and both should be treated separately when evaluating research on money priming. 
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Be that as it may, more generally, we suggest not merely to look for whether an effect 
appears and replicates, but in the interest of scientific advance to strictly test the predictions 
that derive from theory and understand the conditions that moderate its occurrence (Cesario 
& Jonas, 2014; Locke, 2015; Wheeler & Berger, 2007). Interindividual differences such as 
subjective SES may help to account for controversial findings in the field and expand our 
understanding of the psychological effects of money in general. Interestingly, the mental 
activation of money may not necessarily lead to the same behavioral outcomes and judgments 
for different people. While being reminded of money may make the privileged endorse the 
status quo, it may cause the less privileged to challenge this status and question the 
foundations of society.  
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Appendix A 
Original Descrambling Task (Vohs et al., 2006) 
Instructions: 
“The following test is part of an international project about playful methods for learning a language,  
provided by the Institute of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences. 
 
 
Your task is to descramble the provided words in order to create a meaningful sentence 
Please write one correct sentence using ONLY 4 of the 5 words in each line. 
For example: went earlier she word swimming = she went swimming earlier” 
 
Table A1. 
Phrases used in the original descrambling task. 
Phrase Control Group Experimental Group 
1 you held pencil building the you held pencil building the 
2 on printer grass she walked received a raise blue she 
3 took tight he a glass I a cashed pen cheque 
4 to she music listened jump to she music listened jump 
5 metal I wrote letter the metal I wrote letter the 
6 ski she to wanted many has the capital line he 
7 opens he door his top received they large city profits 
8 we later will mountain swim we later will mountain swim 
9 is green the sweater bottom revenues our rising book are 
10 you coming are here purple is green the sweater bottom 
11 camping ten went girls book hundred bill one bottle dollar 
12 loves she skirt silky her you coming are here purple 
13 to car need we talk camping ten went girls book 
14 sky went gray the is won green the I lottery 
15 meal she the calendar ate he wealthy is cup very 
16 again late worked watch we is hard he win studying 
17 gift he the helping gave secure I words financially am 
18 paper long going was the sky went gray the is 
19 is outside cold desk it pockets he deep blue has 
20 dishes we washed song the we cup afford can it 
 1 
Phrase Control Group Experimental Group 
21 room dark the city is again late worked watch we 
22 we coffee for went white finances he manages mouse well 
23 walked the keyboard dog she paper long going was the 
24 exam was the grass challenging is outside cold desk it 
25 up the stadium pick book 
 
liberally money she paperclip spends 
26 was fun outside party the on printer grass she walked 
27 is making sun dinner who job well pays the arrow 
28 read she paper the light took tight he a glass 
29 deep the water number is salary paying high desk a 
30 volume turn the flower up opens he door his top 
 
Note. Money phrases are displayed on a grey background.
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Appendix B 
Modified Descrambling Task 
 
Instructions: 
“The following test is part of an international project about playful methods for learning a language,  
provided by the Institute of Cognitive and Linguistic Sciences. 
 
 
Your task is to descramble the provided words in order to create a meaningful sentence 
Please write one correct sentence using ONLY 4 of the 5 words in each line. 
For example: went earlier she word swimming = she went swimming earlier” 
 
 
Table B1. 
Phrases used in the modified descrambling task.      
Phrase Control Group “My-money  Group” “Their-money Group” 
1 you held pencil building the you held pencil building the you held pencil building the 
2 on printer grass she walked received a raise blue I received a raise blue she 
3 took tight he a glass We a cashed pen cheque Peter a cashed pen cheque 
4 to she music listened jump to she music listened jump to she music listened jump 
5 metal I wrote letter the metal I wrote letter the metal I wrote letter the 
6 ski she to wanted many have the capital line we has the capital line he 
7 opens he door his top received I large city profits received they large city profits 
8 we later will mountain swim we later will mountain swim we later will mountain swim 
9 is green the sweater bottom revenues my rising book are revenues their rising book are 
10 you coming are here purple is green the sweater bottom is green the sweater bottom 
11 camping ten went girls book I the team bottle sponsor He the team bottle sponsors 
12 is hard he win studying you coming are here purple you coming are here purple 
13 bill the going sent we camping ten went girls book camping ten went girls book 
14 sky went gray the is won green the we lottery won green the Mary lottery 
15 meal she the calendar ate I wealthy am cup very he wealthy is cup very 
16 again late worked watch we is hard he win studying is hard he win studying 
 1 
Phrase Control Group “My-money  Group” “Their-money Group” 
17 gift he the helping gave secure we words financially are secure they words financially are 
18 paper long going was the sky went gray the is sky went gray the is 
19 is outside cold desk it pockets I deep blue have pockets he deep blue has 
20 dishes we washed song the We cup afford can it They cup afford can it 
21 room dark the city is again late worked watch we again late worked watch we 
22 we coffee for went white finances I manage mouse well finances he manages mouse well 
23 walked the keyboard dog she paper long going was the paper long going was the 
24 exam was the grass challenging is outside cold desk it is outside cold desk it 
25 up the stadium pick book liberally money I paperclip spend liberally money she paperclip spends 
26 was fun outside party the on printer grass she walked on printer grass she walked 
27 is making sun dinner who job well pays my arrow job well pays his arrow 
28 read she paper the light took tight he a glass took tight he a glass 
29 deep the water number is salary is high desk my salary is high desk his 
30 volume turn the flower up opens he door his top opens he door his top 
 
Note. Money phrases are displayed on a grey background. Bold phrases are new scramble sentences creations in 
order to produce phrases with personal pronouns.
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Appendix C 
Word Stem Completion task (Vohs et al., 2006) 
 
Instructions: 
“Completion task 
 
In this task we ask you to complete each word stem in order to create meaningful words.  
Please answer as fast and intuitively as possible. 
Example: "li" could be completed as "life" or "little". “ 
 
Table C1. 
Items and possible answers of the word stem completion task. 
 
Note. Word stems and completions related to money are put in bold.  
 
 
Word Stem Completion Other Possible Completions 
Sp Spend Spider, spinach, spine, sprawl 
Ri Rich Right, rifle, ring, ridge 
Ca Cash Caterpillar, cat, cab, candle 
Co Coin Condition, cord, cobweb, cool 
mon Money Monday, monsoon, monster 
Fort Fortune Fortress, fortnight, fortitude 
Wea Wealth Weather, wear, weapon 
Nat Nature Natural, native, nationality 
Ho Home Homework, house, hold 
Wi Window Winter, wild, with 
hea Heart Heat, heater, hear 
Tr Tree Treasure, try, trouble, trespass 
Sh Shoe Shower, show, shade 
Dr Drink Drug, drag, drop 
Bot Bottle Bottom, botanical, bothersome 
 3 
Appendix D 
Study 3 
 
Design. This study was identical with study 1 and executed at the same time, except 
that we used the Belief in a Just World Scale (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) instead of the System 
Justification Scale as a dependent variable. From 150 participants five left no data and 22 did 
not follow the instructions to create four-word phrases in the manipulation. This resulted in 
123 participants.   
Materials and procedure.  The procedure was equivalent to study 1. The 20-item 
Belief in a Just World Scale as an adapted version by Caruso et al. (2013; 1 = strongly 
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) resulted in a reliability of α = .66. 
Results.  A t-test revealed that money-reminded participants created marginally 
significant more money words (n = 60, M = 1.12, SD = 1.09) than when not reminded of 
money (n= 63, M = 0.81, SD = 0.82), t(121) =1.77, p = .08, d = 0.32, 95% CI = [-0.04, 0.68]. 
This effect was smaller than previous studies using this method (Vohs et al., 2006) and not -
moderated by subjective SES, b = -0.04, t(118) = 0.41, p = .68, 95% CI = [-0.23, 0.15]. 
To test our moderation hypothesis, we regressed system justification on the prime (-1 
= control, 1 = money; mean centered), subjective SES (1 – 10; mean-centered), SES-order (-1 
= before manipulation, 1 = after dependent variable; mean-centered) and all interaction terms. 
For participants with an average value in subjective SES, the money prime (M = 3.97, SD = 
0.63) did not lead to stronger just-world beliefs than in the control condition (M = 4.04, SD = 
0.44), b = -0.07, t(114) = 0.73, p = .47, 95% CI = [-0.27, 0.12]. Subjective SES significantly 
affected participants’ system justification, b = 0.03, t(114) = 1.27, p = .21, 95% CI = [-0.02, 
0.09] with people higher in subjective SES reporting higher system justification. The 
expected interaction of money and subjective SES did not significantly predicted just-world 
 4 
beliefs, b = 0.05, t(114) = 0.92, p = .36, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.16], f2 = .01, [0, 0.03].1 This 
interaction was not affected by SES-order. Neither the three-way interaction, b = 0.01, t(114) 
= 0.11, p = .91, 95% CI = [-0.20, 0.23], nor the two-way SES-order x Prime, b = 0.08, t(114) 
= 0.39, p = .70, 95% CI = [-0.31, 0.47], SES-order x Subjective SES, b = -0.01, t(114) = 0.15, 
p = .88, 95% CI = [-0.12, 0.10], or the  effect of SES-order were significant, b = -0.02, t(114) 
= 0.25, p = .81, 95% CI = [-0.22, 0.17]. Collapsing over SES-order, simple slope analysis 
(Hayes, 2013) revealed neither a significant effect of subjective SES on system justification 
in the control condition, b = 0.01, t(118) = 0.31, p = .76, 95% CI = [-0.06, 0.08] nor in the 
money condition, b = 0.06, t(118) = 1.57, p = .12, 95% CI = [-0.02, 0.14]. 
1 When applying a more liberal dropout criterion that comprised participants who interrupted the study (n = 4; 
>= 24.0 min, i.e. upper quartile + 1.5 interquartile range) non-native speakers (6), participants who reported to 
be distracted (2) and one person who reported to have been “wrongfully injured by a corrupt legal system” the 
interaction was still not significant , b = 0.07, t(102) = 1.19, p = .24, 95% CI = [-0.05, 0.19]. 
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Abstract 
Former research suggested that money primes might affect people’s political orientation.  In a 
multistudy approach across seven studies we explored this research question. Throughout the 
studies we used different dependent variables and samples and combined the results in a 
small-scale meta-analysis to test two competing hypotheses. Independent of the measures and 
experimental setting, our findings did not indicate that money primes lead to stronger right-
wing orientations (hypothesis 1). The results for our alternative hypothesis that the effect is 
moderated by subjective socioeconomic status revealed some empirical support for an 
interaction effect and showed marginal significance. These findings suggest that, contrary to 
former research and theoretical predictions, the money priming effect on political orientation 
is most likely small and dependent on one’s subjective socioeconomic status. Possible 
implications for money priming research and political psychology are discussed. 
 
Keywords 
Money, priming, political orientation, meta-analysis 
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Introduction 
Money is a central cue in our everyday life. In the modern western world it is barely 
possible not to get in touch with money or money-related cues. In this regard it seems 
somewhat concerning that research has shown that subtle reminders of money can have 
tremendous effects on people’s behavior and attitudes across different cultural backgrounds 
and age groups  (for review see: Vohs, 2015). Regardless of whether participants are Asian, 
European or American, when being primed with money, they tend to work more persistently 
on tasks (Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Vohs, 2015; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006) and focus more 
on their own personal needs and goals (Vohs et al., 2006; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008). 
However this emphasis on the personal self comes along with less concern about others. 
Subjects reminded of money have shown to be less inclined to help others (e.g., Vohs et al., 
2006) and less susceptible to others’ needs (Gino & Mogilner, 2014; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, 
Brief, & Sousa, 2013; Reutner & Wänke, 2013). While it seems that being subtly reminded of 
money is beneficial for the personal self, it is bad for the social self (Vohs et al., 2008). Thus, 
not surprisingly, money priming can also affect attitudes about the societal structure. Caruso, 
Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013) found that U.S.-participants reminded of money were more 
likely to justify the existing system, belief in a just world, accept social inequality and 
dominance, and to endorse free-market systems.  
It should be noted that these beliefs, the endorsement of free-market systems, the 
justification and the belief in the existing system, and the acceptance of social inequality and 
social dominance are deemed as underlying core beliefs of political right-wing orientation 
(Jost, Blount, Pfeffer, & Hunyady, 2003; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2005). Also suggesting the notion of a parallel between a political right-wing 
orientation and the effects of being reminded of money, right-wing politics value personal 
effort and achievement (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; 
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Feldman, 2013; Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009), as do participants who were reminded of 
money (Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Vohs, 2015; Vohs et al., 2006, 2008; Zedelius, Veling, & 
Aarts, 2013). Analogously the diminished concern for others’ needs stands in contrast to left-
wing politics, which typically defend social egalitarianism, justice and social support for 
other’s needs (Edlund & Pande, 2002; Jæger, 2008; Roemer, 1998). Hence, given that money 
primes can change people’s underlying political beliefs would they also affect people’s 
general political orientation (also termed political ideology; see Jost, 2006)? 
The Present Research 
In contrast to a person’s political beliefs or attitudes, the general political orientation 
represents a person’s placement on a political dimension (left-right; Piurko, Schwartz, & 
Davidov, 2011) and reflects a broader range of motivational and attitudinal aspects than the 
previously assessed political core beliefs (Caruso et al., 2013; Klein et al., 2014). In other 
words, while underlying political beliefs usually reflect content-specific attitudes, the general 
political orientation is affected by a wide range of different factors such as social identity, 
personality, values, beliefs, and situational influences (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Crawford, Brady, 
Pilanski, & Erny, 2013; Jost, 2006; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012; Keefer, Goode, & 
Van Berkel, 2015). However, even though the political orientation of a person depends on 
many different factors, it is not invariant. Previous studies have shown empirical evidence 
that subtle contextual primes can activate certain norms and concepts and have powerful 
effects on political judgments (Berger, Meredith, & Wheeler, 2008; Burger & Bless, 2016; 
Druckman, 2004; Weinberger & Westen, 2008) and on people’s general political orientation 
(Brown-Iannuzzi, Lundberg, Kay, & Payne, 2015; Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011). For 
example, Helzer and Pizarro (2011) have shown that the mere presence of a hand-sanitizer 
dispenser in a hallway is sufficient to provoke changes in participants’ general political 
orientations reported on a field-survey.   
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Therefore, in the present research we aimed to thoroughly test whether money primes - 
beyond changing certain underlying right-wing beliefs - would also affect participants’ 
general political orientation. Such an effect on political orientation could have wide-ranging 
implications and would render money primes a considerable subtle instrument for right-wing 
party campaigns. Nowadays, governments put an increasing effort in eliminating undue 
influence on voting (cf. Berger et al., 2008), while increasing evidence shows that subtle 
primes can be successfully applied in voting campaigns (Druckman, 2004; Weinberger & 
Westen, 2008) and can alter people’s political judgments in quite a long-lasting way (Carter et 
al., 2011). But political campaigns are not the only possible source where money cues might 
substantially alter people’s political orientation. Due to the ubiquity of money cues in 
people’s lives that show no signs of waning (Vohs et al., 2008), money could – even if only 
for a short instant - unobtrusively affect, whether one signs a political petition, reads certain 
information from a political party, or simply to which political opinion a person pays attention 
on Facebook.  
In sum, we sought to test in an experimental setting, whether money primes would lead 
participants to change their self-reported political orientation and their preferences for 
political parties, which could – in its most extreme consequence - even alter people’s voting 
behavior in real life. While so far our argument suggested a possible main effect, there is also 
evidence suggesting a more complex effect. Both hypotheses are outlined as follows.  
Main-effect-hypothesis. Previous research across Western countries suggested that some 
of the core beliefs of political right-wing orientation such as the acceptance of social 
inequality, social dominance orientation, the justification of free market systems, and the 
conviction that only personal effort and achievement should be rewarded, are susceptible to 
subtle cues of money (Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Caruso et al., 2013; Vohs, 2015; Vohs et al., 
2006, 2008; Zedelius et al., 2013). Thus, one may hypothesize that reminders of money subtly 
Running	head:	DOES	MONEY	CHANGE	POLITICAL	VIEWS?	 6	
	
shift participants’ political orientation to the right, because money primes change the beliefs 
and values on which it is built on.  
Moderation-hypothesis. During the course of this research, the assumption that money 
generally triggers right-wing beliefs had been challenged. Schuler and Wänke (2016) 
reasoned that if reminders of money lead to a focus on the self and one’s personal advantages 
(e.g., Gino & Pierce, 2009; Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Vohs, 2015; Vohs et al., 2006), one 
should favor a societal system also more to the extent that it serves one’s personal needs. In 
other words, when money - as hypothesized - stimulates people to focus more on their 
personal benefits, the justification of a system should also be more in accordance with one’s 
personal interests compared to the necessities of others. Accordingly, the authors showed that 
when being primed with money, U.S.-participants who felt socioeconomically privileged 
showed more support of the U.S.-American societal system that favors members from the 
upper levels of society, compared to participants who felt socioeconomically disadvantaged. 
In line with this reasoning, one would hypothesize that reminders of money lead to an 
elevated focus on one’s personal needs which in turn influences participants’ political 
orientation according to their perceived standing in the social hierarchy (i.e. subjective 
socioeconomic status [subjective SES]) as well. When being primed with money, only those 
who believe they would actually benefit from its policies and the general ideology that comes 
along with it, should endorse right-wing politics. In other words, when considering oneself at 
the top of the social hierarchy (higher subjective SES), right-wing politics, which – by 
tendency – aim to preserve the social order and criticize social egalitarianism, redistribution, 
and equal chances (Giddens, 1998; Jost, Glaser, et al., 2003; Roemer, 1998), are more in line 
with one’s personal interests (see Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015). For people who see 
themselves more at the bottom of society (lower subjective SES) this benefit is less clear. On 
the one hand, they should favor left-wing politics when inclined to pursue their personal 
interests through money primes. Left-wing politics seek to minimize social hierarchies, 
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support the interests of the disadvantaged, and fight for inclusion, redistribution, and equal 
rights (Edlund & Pande, 2002; Jæger, 2008; Shen & LaBouff, 2016) and are therefore 
supported by people with a lower subjective SES (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, people with a lower subjective SES do not necessarily believe that left-wing politics 
would be favorable for them (e.g., Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Ni Sullivan, 2003). Still, overall 
priming effects should be more pronounced for those subjectively higher in the social 
hierarchy and therefore moderated by subjective SES.  
Methodological Approach 
To perform a rigorous test of the hypothesis that money primes affect political orientation, 
we adopted a multistudy approach using different dependent variables throughout the studies. 
Such an approach is more informative than the test of a single paradigm (Tuk, Zhang, & 
Sweldens, 2015) and allows examining whether a possible underlying effect is restricted to a 
certain measure or whether a possible effect generalizes across several measures. Because the 
moderation-hypothesis seemed a plausible alternative to the main-effect-hypothesis, we 
included subjective SES as a possible moderator for the second half of our studies and 
conducted further studies online to increase the samples’ variance on subjective SES.  
 To overcome power problems in single studies (Cumming, 2014; Tuk et al., 2015), we 
conducted a small-scale meta-analysis (Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014; Goh, Hall, & 
Rosenthal, 2016) across our studies.  The analysis is based on more data, has smaller 
confidence intervals for the estimated effect size and is thus more reliable in detecting 
whether an effect exists or not (Cumming, 2012). Moreover, by applying a random-effects 
model, the internal meta-analysis can indicate whether the obtained effect sizes represent the 
same or different underlying effects and can – depending and limited by the number of 
included studies – help to detect possible moderators across studies (Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). Because tests for heterogeneity and moderators tend to be 
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underpowered with small amounts of studies (k < 20; Huedo-Medina, Sánchez-Meca, Marín-
Martínez, & Botella, 2006), we set the alpha level for both tests to .10 (Tuk et al., 2015). 
Furthermore and as an additional criteria for heterogeneity that is independent from the 
included number of studies, we applied I2 > 50% as a criterion for heterogeneity (Braver et al., 
2014).  
In the present research, we present data of seven studies. Because we used different 
dependent variables to test our hypotheses and the settings slightly varied from study to study 
(i.e. we performed conceptual replications), it is possible that the true underlying effect sizes 
differ. Thus, we used a random-effects model in our meta-analysis as the generally more 
appropriate method of analysis (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010; Cumming, 
2012). We first provide a general description of our samples and dropout criteria and then 
proceed with descriptions of the manipulation, the dependent variables and subjective SES as 
a possible moderator. After providing an overview of our studies, we test our two hypotheses 
and conduct some exploratory moderation analysis.   
Method 
The studies were either conducted in the laboratory or online. All studies had in common 
that participants worked on two ostensibly unrelated experiments. Across all studies the first 
experiment was a money priming manipulation that was framed as a language task on playful 
learning methods and comprised a descrambling sentence task (see Hansen, Kutzner, & 
Wänke, 2013). The second experiment was framed as a study on decision-making and 
contained one of the dependent variables. Minor variations between studies, such as whether 
demographic information was assessed at the beginning or at the end of the study, are 
described in Appendix A.  
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Participants and Dropouts 
In all studies we exclusively recruited German participants to retain the same manipulation 
and to be able to relate studies where we used preferences for German political parties as the 
dependent measure with studies where we used self-reports of political orientation. Because 
the suggested psychological mechanisms of money priming seem to be universal and have 
been found across many different countries (see Vohs, 2015), we did not expect particular 
cultural differences.  
For a total of seven studies (N = 666; Table 1) we applied one common dropout-criterion to 
make sure only those participants who were adequately primed with money, were included in 
the studies. Hence, we excluded participants who participated twice (33), participants who did 
not follow the instructions to create four-word phrases in the priming task (18), non-German 
native speakers (due to the language-based prime; 27) and participants who interrupted the 
study (i.e., upper quartile of study duration + 1.5 interquartile range; 16).i The remaining 
sample consisted of 572 participants (237 males, 2 other; Mage = 28.5, SD = 11.5).  
Independent Variable and moderator 
Descrambling Task. Participants were provided with 22 word-sets, each consisting of five 
words and had to descramble each set into a correct sentence of four words. In the 
experimental condition, 15 out of 22 word-sets contained words associated with money (e.g. 
money, salary, coin, cashbox). In the control group these words were substituted with money-
unrelated words.  
Subjective Socioeconomic Status (subjective SES). In order to assess subjective SES, 
participants completed a digital version of the MacArthur Scale (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng & 
Keltner, 2010). An image of a 10-rung ladder was depicted as a representation of where 
people stand in society. While the top rung was labeled as representing those with the highest 
standing in the social hierarchy, the lowest rung was labeled as representing those with the 
Running	head:	DOES	MONEY	CHANGE	POLITICAL	VIEWS?	 10	
	
lowest standing in the social hierarchy. To measure subjective SES, participants were 
instructed to indicate on a 10-point scale where they would place themselves on this ladder 
relative to others in society (M = 5.94, SD = 1.75; only studies 4-7). 
Dependent Variables 
Self-report (A). As a measure for political orientation that we used in our first study, we 
applied a three-item measure that had been shown to be sensitive to environmental influences 
(Helzer & Pizarro, 2011). Participants were asked to which extent they identify themselves as 
fiscally, morally and socially conservative (1 = very conservative) or liberal (7 = very liberal). 
The inter-item correlation of the fiscal item was low ( rmoral = .05; rsocial = -.02), which was 
possibly due to the unclear meaning of the term fiscal conservatism among German 
participants.ii Hence, the reliability of the three-item scale was low, with a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .48 (Cronbach’s α = .65 in Helzer & Pizarro, 2011). The removal of the fiscal item raised 
the internal consistency to a Cronbach’s alpha of .76. In consequence, we conducted the 
analysis with the two-item version of the scale and used different items for self-reported 
political orientation for subsequent studies.  
Self-report (B). For the succeeding studies we used an item from a German Political Panel 
Study (Breyer, 2015) that reflects participants’ self-placement on an inter-culturally robust 
left-right dimension (Piurko et al., 2011). To assess general political orientation (“Where 
would you place yourself if 1 was left and 11 was right?”), participants reported their political 
orientation on an eleven-point scale.iii  
Political party preferences. As a complement to the self-report measures, we asked 
participants to indicate their preference for the six most popular political parties in Germany 
at the time (Die Linke, Die Grünen, SPD, AFD, CDU/CSU, FDP). To compute our dependent 
variable, each participant evaluated the six parties in a randomized order (1, “very negative” – 
11, “very positive”). We also obtained ratings for the perceived general political orientation of 
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each party (1, “very left-wing” – 4 “very right-wing”) in an independent pretest (see 
Appendix B for details). To compute an index for political orientation, we then calculated 
Fisher’s z between the parties’ political orientation scores (assessed in the pretest) and 
participants’ evaluations of each party (assessed in each study). Correlation-scores above 0 
indicate a more favourable rating for parties considered on the political right compared to 
parties considered left. Correlation-scores below 0 indicate the opposite. Our measure for 
party preferences consistently showed strong correlations with participants’ self-reported 
political orientation (assessed before the manipulation) in the control groups of each 
experiment (rrange = .54 - .65; see Appendix C for details). We thus used the obtained indices, 
which are typically strongly related to left-right self-placement measures (Van Deth & Geurts, 
1989), as a reliable choice measure for political orientation. 
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Table 1  
Studies Overview With Different Dependent Variables  
# Nincluded Study Type DV Moderator 
1 76 Lab Self-report (A)  
2 104 Lab Party preferences  
3 63 Lab Party preferences  
4 70 Lab Self-report (B) SES 
5 101 Online Self-report (B) SES 
6 65 Online Self-report (B) SES 
7 93 Online Party preferences SES 
Note. Nincluded = participants included in the analysis; DV = dependent variable; Self-
report = self-report measures (A) and (B); Party preferences = preference measure for 
political parties; SES = subjective socioeconomic status.  
 
Results 
We meta-analyzed our studies by converting main effects and interaction effects into 
Pearson’s correlation for comparability and ease of interpretation (see Appendix D for 
complete overview). All correlations were then transformed into Fisher’s z for analysis. For 
our internal meta-analyses we applied a random-effects model (fitted with a restricted 
maximum-likelihood estimator for heterogeneity; see Viechtbauer, 2005), using the package 
METAFOR in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). The meta-analytic estimates and the respective 
confidence intervals were then converted back to Pearson’s correlation coefficient for 
presentation throughout the text (cf. Goh et al., 2016).  
The main-effect hypothesis 
Overall, the small-scale meta-analysis on participants’ right-wing orientation revealed a 
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non-significant effect in the opposite direction. As shown in Figure 1, money-primed 
participants did not report significantly higher right-wing orientations than participants not 
reminded of money, N = 564, r = -.07, 95% CI = [-0.17, 0.02], Z = -1.57, p = .117, Q(6) = 
7.00, p = .32, I2 = 17.83%. The meta-analysis across all participants revealed similar results.iv.  
 
Figure 1. Forest plot of the effect of money priming on political orientation. Positive effects reflect stronger 
right-wing orientation after being reminded of money. For each included study, the measure type, the setting, 
Fisher’s z value, and the corresponding 95% confidence interval (black lines) are reported. The effect sizes are 
illustrated with squares whose sizes are representing the relative weight of each study in the random-effects meta-
analysis. The diamond depicts the effect size of the meta-analytic estimate and its 95% confidence interval.   
 
The cumulative evidence of our seven studies did not support the hypothesis that being 
reminded of money leads to stronger right-wing preferences. Considering the small 
confidence intervals of the effect size estimate (for a detailed interpretation of confidence 
intervals see Cumming, 2012), one can conclude that the effect is most likely either 
essentially zero or small and in the opposite direction as predicted.  
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The interaction-effect hypothesis 
To test the hypothesis that subjective SES moderates the effect of money priming on 
political orientation, we once again performed a small-scale meta-analysis. The meta-analysis 
(Figure 2) now revealed a marginally significant interaction effect in the expected direction, N 
= 327, r = 0.14, 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.28], Z = 1.83, p = .068, Q(3) = 5.42, p = .14, I2 = 
42.97%.v Heterogeneity analysis indicated moderate but not disproportionate levels of 
heterogeneity.  
 
Figure 2. Forest plot of the interaction effect of money priming x subjective socioeconomic status (SES) on 
political orientation. Positive effects reflect stronger (weaker) right-wing orientation for participants with higher 
(lower) subjective SES after being reminded of money. For each included study, the measure type, the setting, 
Fisher’s z value, and the corresponding 95% confidence interval (black lines) are reported. The effect sizes are 
illustrated with squares whose sizes are representing the relative weight of each study in the random-effects meta-
analysis. The diamond depicts the effect size of the meta-analytic estimate and its 95% confidence interval.   
 
Evidence across the four studies revealed that participants with higher subjective SES 
showed stronger and participants with lower subjective SES showed weaker right-wing 
orientations when being reminded of money compared to participants in the control condition 
(Figure 3).  
Running	head:	DOES	MONEY	CHANGE	POLITICAL	VIEWS?	 15	
	
 
 
Figure 3. Synthesized simple slopes of control (β = 0.017) and money condition (β = 0.291) for 
studies 4 – 7. To allow for accumulation, beta regression coefficients were derived from z-
standardized variables and synthesized with a weighted least squares approach (Becker & Wu, 
2007). Values of right-wing political orientation above zero indicate stronger right-wing 
orientation and values below zero indicate stronger left-wing orientation for lower (1 SD below 
the mean) and higher (1 SD above the mean) subjective SES. SES = socioeconomic status. 
  
 
The cumulative analysis on the direct measures seems to provide some tentative support 
for the interaction hypothesis. In contrast to the main effect hypothesis and in line with 
previous research (Schuler & Wänke, 2016), the cumulative evidence revealed a marginally 
significant effect for the moderation hypothesis.  However, the effect is most likely small to 
medium sized and further studies would be needed to provide evidence for the effect.  
Moderation analyses 
Interestingly, the interaction effect money x subjective SES on the direct measures 
revealed moderate heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is generally not surprising, because 
variability in priming effects across different samples and contexts should actually be 
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expected (Cesario, 2014). Past priming research has revealed a great variety of moderating 
factors (e.g., DeMarree, Wheeler, & Petty, 2005; Ma & Correll, 2011; Yi, 1993). Thus, many 
critical factors within the sample and the experimental design that might seem irrelevant can, 
if varied, eliminate or even reverse priming effects. Yet, even though such moderators clearly 
decrease the generalizability of the priming effect, they are of significant value for 
researchers. Priming research is still in its beginning with regard to the exploration of its 
processes and its process related variables. Thus, the discovery of moderating variables can 
provide meaningful information about the effect and the theory (Cesario, 2014).  
To test for the variation in the interaction effect money x subjective SES between the 
studies, we applied a mixed-effects model (Borenstein et al., 2009) and explored two 
potentially relevant characteristics that could have caused some of the variance in our priming 
effects. First, different measures might have varied in their sensitivity to assess political 
orientation and thus possibly caused different effect sizes. However, whether we used self-
reports (A & B) or the choice measure (party preferences) to assess political orientation did 
not significantly moderate the overall effect, QM [df = 1] = 0.10, p = .755. Second, our studies 
in the laboratory differed in many aspects from our online studies. Factors such as the 
elevated subjective SES among our laboratory samples (6.68 versus online: 5.82), being 
surrounded by in-group members in the laboratory (Fessler & Holbrook, 2013) or a difference 
in the intensity of the prime in the laboratory compared to the online studies could have 
potentially moderated the results. However, the study location did not show statistically 
significant differences in the effect sizes across studies, QM [df = 1] = 0.47, p = .493.  
 Even though our analyses did not reveal significant moderators, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that study location or the application of different measures moderate the effect. 
With few studies, the power to detect relevant moderators decreases and therefore the 
moderation analyses should be interpreted with caution (Borenstein et al., 2009).  
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Discussion 
We considered the hypothesis that money primes change people’s political orientation, an 
important question for basic research and for its relevance in real life, which was implied by 
several publications (e.g., Caruso et al., 2013; Vohs, 2015; Zedelius et al., 2013) and 
subsequently questioned by other researchers (Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 
2015; Schuler & Wänke, 2016; Vadillo, Hardwicke, & Shanks, 2016).  
From a basic research perspective, it was interesting to note that the predictions and 
empirical findings of money priming allow for two competing hypotheses. On the one hand, 
money primes evoke a focus on personal achievement and make people less sensitive to the 
needs of others (Vohs et al., 2008). Thus, because money priming triggers central convictions 
of right-wing politics, money primes should also make people endorse right-wing politics in 
general. On the other hand, reminders of money lead to a focus on personal concerns and 
one’s personal advantages (see Gino & Pierce, 2009; Kouchaki et al., 2013; Reutner & 
Wänke, 2013; Vohs, 2015; Vohs et al., 2006). Thus, money priming should make people 
endorse a political orientation that increases their personal benefits. More specifically, when 
primed with money, people should favor right-wing politics when feeling socioeconomically 
privileged and less so when feeling socioeconomically disadvantaged. These two opposing 
predictions did not only emphasize the relevance to investigate this research question but 
suggest as well that a more specified theory of money priming might be warranted.  
From an application perspective, the question whether subtle money primes could alter 
people’s political orientation is of fundamental relevance. In western societies, money cues 
become rather abundant and could thus – as a repetitive prime – potentially provoke lasting 
changes in people’s political orientation and ultimately voting behavior (cf. Carter et al., 
2011). As a prerequisite, money primes would need to work in the field - not only in 
experimental settings – and would need to have long lasting effects. Recent research 
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demonstrates the efficacy of money priming in noisy real-life contexts such as coffee bars 
(Mogilner, 2010), on the street (Guéguen & Jacob, 2013), or in work environments (Mok & 
De Cremer, 2016) on daily behaviors. More importantly, Beus and Whitman (2015) suggest 
that money can have durable effects in work contexts, when made chronically salient. An 
effect of money cues, whether shortly before the voting booth or as a repetitive visual cue in 
political campaigns and daily contexts, would be rather troubling and calls for careful 
examination.  
Hence, we adopted a multistudy approach to examine this question. Across seven studies, 
we found little evidence for a main effect of money priming on political orientation among 
German participants. Furthermore, for the alternative hypothesis that subjective SES 
moderates the priming effect on political orientation, we found tentative, marginally 
significant evidence for a small to medium size effect.  
Before reasoning about the implications of these results, it is useful to consider possible 
shortcomings of this research. First, Caruso and colleagues (2013) found money priming 
effects on certain political beliefs only among U.S.-American participants, “because the key 
components of the experimental design were focused on America” (p. 304). Although our 
measures were not restricted to U.S.-participants, it is possible that money-priming effects on 
political orientation would reveal different results with US-participants due to cultural 
differences. However, we find this to be unlikely. Empirical support for the theoretical claim 
that money priming makes people more focused on themselves and their personal benefits has 
been shown across different countries and cultural backgrounds (Vohs, 2015). Furthermore, 
Schuler and Wänke (2016) tested U.S.-participants and found an interaction that concurs with 
our findings. Thus, although it remains an empirical question, we are not aware of a 
moderator in the field that would make different predictions for U.S.- and German 
participants regarding the suggested effect. Second, it is unclear how and whether these 
effects would generalize in noisy real-life environments, in which a myriad of different 
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factors drives people’s actions (Mogilner, 2010). Even though previous research suggests that 
the effects of money priming can have significant effects in the field (e.g., Guéguen & Jacob, 
2013; Mok & De Cremer, 2016), it remains an open question to which degree money primes 
could influence actual political orientation or voting behavior during an election.   
Conclusions 
Although more research is needed to conclude whether an interaction effect exists or not, 
our data provide some interesting conclusions. On the one hand, we found tentative evidence 
for the theoretically predicted interaction effect with subjective SES. After a decade of 
promising money priming research (Vohs, 2015) more and more researchers raise questions 
about the robustness, replicability, and credibility of the discovered effects and their 
theoretical framework (Klein et al., 2014; Pashler, Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, & Harris, 
2016; Rohrer et al., 2015; Vadillo et al., 2016). Perhaps it is time to thoroughly search for 
moderators and limitations of money priming, and to advance the field and the theory for 
future research. Interestingly, it appears that a person’s standing in the social hierarchy, which 
has become increasingly important for social psychology in general (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 
2015; Gruenewald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006; Keefer et al., 2015; Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 
2010), also plays a role for money priming (see also Schuler & Wänke, 2016) and might 
partly explain why money priming effects are generally not so robust. Hence, it seems 
worthwhile to keep this meaningful variable in mind when conducting future research with 
more representative or diversified samples in social and political psychology.  
On the other hand, our goal was to examine whether the effects of money priming would 
have practical relevance for society. At first glance, our findings suggest that there is most 
likely little menace to the political processes in real life. Under relatively controlled settings, 
we found some tentative evidence for a small to medium money prime interaction effect, 
which might not hold in more unstable settings. It may well be that such priming effects are 
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smaller and much more limited than oftentimes assumed (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; 
Weinberger & Westen, 2008) even though, depending on the context of the prime and further 
moderators, it is of course possible that the prime produces significant effects in real-life 
environments as has been indicated with similar environmental cues (Carter et al., 2011).  
Accordingly, this research opened up some interesting lines for future research. A closer 
investigation of certain facets of political orientation such as its economic and social 
dimension (Ashton et al., 2005; Everett, 2013) could reveal that cues of money affect these 
concepts differently. Former research (Caruso et al., 2013) indicated that beliefs (e.g., social 
dominance orientation) associated with the economic dimension of political orientation (Jost, 
Federico, & Napier, 2009) were influenced by money priming. These findings fit with the 
general assumption that money primes would rather affect a dimension labeled compassion 
vs. competition (economic) than a dimension labeled moral regulation vs. individual freedom 
(social; cf. Ashton et al., 2005). Following a compatibility logic (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), 
this would imply that our dependent variables measured a broader concept (political 
orientation) and that measuring a sub-dimension would lead to stronger effects. Furthermore, 
considering the potential implications that unobtrusive money priming effects would have for 
elections, field experiments would be a useful complement to our research to examine 
whether an effect on political decisions and ideologies holds in this setting. While we do not 
claim that a single priming episode will change people’s attitudes for good it may suffice at a 
given moment to sign a petition, or stop to take a leaflet or listen to a candidate’s arguments. 
While these individual actions might not seem too influential on their own, taken together and 
over time they could tilt opinions in favor of certain political judgments.   
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Appendix 
See supplementary file 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
i Because we were performing a meta-analysis with a comparably large and diverse sample size, we were more 
concerned about making sure that all included participants were correctly primed rather than further increase 
statistical power. We thus applied a more liberal criterion.   
ii With regard to fiscal policies the terms conservative and liberal are not well defined in Germany. For example, 
the liberal party in Germany (FDP) is advocating fiscally conservative policies despite their claim to be 
liberal. Thus, the item might have produced inconsistent responses.  
iii Additionally we assessed two content related political attitudes on immigration and taxation that turned out to 
be unsuitable to assess general political orientation. Due to prominent political events at that time (Euro crisis 
& refugee crisis), the items indicated specific attitudes and revealed a questionable internal consistency when 
included to the general political orientation item (Cronbach’s α range = .59 - .63; George & Mallery, 2003).  
iv Across all participants, money-primed participants did not report significantly higher right-wing orientations 
than participants not reminded of money, N = 653, r = -0.03, 95% CI = [-0.13, 0.06], Z = -0.74, p = .46, Q(6) 
= 8.28, p = .219, I2 = 28.45%. 
v The interaction of money and subjective SES did not significantly predict participants’ right-wing orientation 
across all participants, N = 365, r = 0.16, 95% CI = [-0.03, 0.34], Z = 1.64, p = .102, Q(3) = 9.65, p = .022, I2 
= 70.13%. 
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Appendix A 
Detailed description of study procedures 
 
Study 1. After initial instructions that told participants that they would work on two 
different experiments, they completed the descrambling task, which either contained money 
related words or not. After completion of our ostensible experiment 1, we asked participants 
about the purpose of the study. In experiment 2 they received further instructions (signed by a 
different researcher) and completed the self-report A as a dependent measure. Afterwards 
participants worked on an exploratory perception task, which was not relevant for our 
hypothesis. In the task, we presented ten faces of unknown male politicians and asked 
participants to indicate their voting preference for each of them. Thereby we wanted to 
investigate whether money primes would also affect the preference for warm or competent 
faces. After the perception task, we assessed demographic information and asked participants 
about the purpose of our ostensible experiment 2. 
Study 2. First, participants provided demographic information and indicated their general 
political orientation on self-report B. Afterwards they completed the descrambling task. In the 
ostensible second experiment, participants were first asked to complete the perception task of 
Study 1 and then asked to complete the party preference measure as our dependent measure. 
Lastly, we asked participants about the purpose of the experiment.  
Study 3. This study was a replication of Study 2 with the only exception that we did not 
assess the visual perception task between the manipulation and the dependent measure. As in 
Study 2 general political orientation (self-report B) was assessed before the manipulation. 
Study 4. This Study was a replication of Study 1, with an identical procedure but a 
different dependent variable (self-report B instead of self-report A). Before providing 
demographic information, participants indicated their mood on a brief 3-item scale (the 
difference between the control group and the experimental group was not significant, p = 
.997) to control for mood effects. Additionally, subjective SES was assessed as part of the 
demographic information at the end of the study.  
Study 5. This Study was a replication of Study 4 in which we recruited participants 
through the online platform CrowdFlower. In contrast to Study 4, mood was no longer 
assessed and subjective SES was assessed before the other demographic variables.   
Study 6. This Study was again a replication of Study 4 in which we recruited participants 
online from various online study pools. In contrast to Study 4, mood was no longer assessed. 
Study 7. This Study was a replication of Study 2 in which we recruited participants 
through the online platform CrowdFlower. In this study we did not assess the visual 
perception task between the manipulation and the dependent measure. As in Study 2 general 
political orientation (self-report B) was assessed before the manipulation. Additionally, we 
assessed subjective SES at the end of the study.  
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Appendix B 
Pretest for dependent variable: Political party preferences. 
 
Description of the sample. A total of 96 participants from Germany (34 males; Mage = 
25.61, SD = 6.41) completed the questionnaire after they were recruited online through 
various message-boards on facebook.com. None were excluded before analysis. General 
political orientation was assessed with the same item used as the dependent variable Self-
reported political orientation (B) (“Where would you place yourself if 1 was left and 11 was 
right?”). The sample was left-leaning (M = 4.68, SD = 1.64, Range 1-8). 
 
Table A1  
Political Parties and their left-/right-wing orientation, as rated by 
participants. 
Political Party N M (SD) range 
Die Linke 95 1.09 (0.36) 1-3 
Die Grünen 96 2.00 (0.46) 1-3 
SPD 96 2.11 (0.43) 1-4 
CDU 96 2.94 (0.48) 1-4 
FDP 94 2.81 (0.61) 1-4 
AFD 96 3.70 (0.58) 1-4 
Note. All scales from 1 (left) – 4 (right). N = sample size, M (SD) = mean and 
standard deviation of respective ratings. N varies between parties, because some 
participants failed to provide complete ratings. 
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Abstract	
Replicating previous findings is a cornerstone of science, however many replication 
attempts fail to reproduce significant results. The present report highlights the relevance of the 
largely theoretical discussions on the correct interpretation of non-significant replications and 
possible pitfalls of interpretation: In a first step we show how researchers and readers of the 
psychological literature tend to overinterpret the evidential value from non-significant 
findings. We then contrast these common misconceptions by demonstrating with reported 
replication examples and unreported ‘file-drawer’ studies that non-significant findings can 
meta-analytically provide even more evidence in favor of an effect and should be therefore 
assessed more carefully. We conclude with a discussion on how to interpret the cumulated 
data and a plea to think and test more meta-analytically. 
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Introduction 
Every introductory methods course teaches that replications are crucial for establishing 
external validity because single findings are unreliable. Recently, in the wake of what has 
been referred to as a crisis of confidence the call for replication studies has grown louder and 
there is a widely shared consensus that replications of former findings are essential for a 
cumulative science (e.g., Cesario, 2014; Kahneman, 2012; Simons, 2014). However, even 
though psychologists constantly produce internal replications of their own findings and the 
newly established interest in reproducibility initiated a growing number of replication studies 
(e.g., Doyen, Klein, Pichon, & Cleeremans, 2012; Galak, LeBoeuf, Nelson, & Simmons, 
2012; Gomes & McCullough, 2015; OpenScienceCollaboration, 2015; Van Dessel, De 
Houwer, Roets, & Gast, 2016), not as much attention has been directed on how to thoroughly 
interpret replications that turn out to be non-significant. Most often, it seems that non-
significance is understood as a failure to replicate a former finding (Schmidt & Oh, in press; 
Simonsohn, 2015), which leads researchers to question their hypothesis or the validity of the 
original findings (e.g., Kunert, 2016, May 24; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Srivastava, 2016, 
February 12; Yong, 2016, March 4). As we will outline next, this conclusion is not always 
justified. 
 
Overview  
In the present report, we highlight the practical relevance of the largely theoretical 
discussions among statisticians and methodologists about the interpretation of non-significant 
replications. We do not claim to have developed a new method. Nor do we want to pretend to 
have reinvented statistical significance testing (see Cohen, 1994). But, over the last months, 
we have experienced in numerous exchanges on social media, formal debates, and informal 
conversations that some statistical truisms may not be fully ingrained within social and 
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experimental psychologists. We want to raise awareness for an oftentimes shortsighted 
interpretation of non-significant replications, outline its detrimental consequences and show 
how cumulative meta-analysis (CMA; Braver, Thoemmes, & Rosenthal, 2014) can change it.  
In a first step, we exemplify misbeliefs about the evidential value of non-significant 
replications among researchers and consumers of psychological research and introduce the 
logic of CMA. In a second step, we focus on the evaluation of such ‘failed’ replications. We 
reanalyze data from recently published non-significant replication studies and unreported non-
significant findings using CMA. Our analyses illustrate how non-significant replications can 
reduce as well as increase the overall evidence for an effect and therefore do not necessarily 
provide evidence for the null hypothesis. In a third step, we discuss the evaluation of the 
complete data of original studies and replications and - based on the cumulative evidence - 
whether an effect is empirically supported or not.  
 
Unwarranted Conclusions From ‘Failed’ Replications 
For decades researchers have called attention to the fact that replications should not be 
interpreted in isolation, have discussed the risk of potential misinterpretations that may occur, 
and have pointed out that single studies often only allow inconclusive inferences about the 
underlying effect (e.g., Cohen, 1994; Cumming, 2008; Earp & Trafimow, 2015; Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2016; Rosenthal, 1990, 1997; Schmidt, Ocasio, Hillery, & Hunter, 1985; Schmidt 
& Oh, in press). After all, the success of a replication, defined via statistical significance, 
depends to a great extent on statistical chance (Cumming, 2008; Schmidt & Hunter, 2014; 
Stanley & Spence, 2014). However, despite the knowledge about the unreliability of single 
replications and the available tools to deal with it (e.g., Hunter, Schmidt, & Jackson, 1982), 
most replication studies are still interpreted in isolation.  
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To begin with the problematic consequences from this practice, it is helpful to distinguish 
between one sort of replications where an original study is replicated by a different research 
team (we term such studies as external replications) and another sort of replications where 
researchers conduct a series of conceptually related studies, which aim to assess the same 
postulated effect (we term such studies as internal replications). In reports of external 
replications, the single attempts are often reported without analyzing them in the larger 
context of the original data (see Gil-Gómez de Liaño, Stablum, & Umiltà, 2016; Johnson, 
Cheung, & Donnellan, 2014; Korndörfer, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2015; Pashler, Rohrer, & 
Harris, 2013; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015; Wortman, Donnellan, & Lucas, 2014), which 
can lead to a limited interpretation of the effect. Similarly, original researchers may be led 
astray, because they also tend to analyze and interpret their conceptually related studies only 
in isolation (Goh, Hall, & Rosenthal, 2016). This can then imply that the non-significant 
results are either deemed as ‘not worthy for publication’ by authors, editors and reviewers or 
that it makes authors doubt their former findings. Consequently, by evaluating each study in 
isolation, these researchers might either create a file drawer bias (Rosenthal, 1979) or, equally 
concerning, might relinquish promising research projects due to non-significant findings 
(Fiedler, Kutzner, & Krueger, 2012).  
The isolated consideration of replications is particularly worrisome because some beliefs 
about non-significance are flawed and can have severe consequences for the theoretical 
interpretation of replication results. One common belief claims “non-significance means no 
effect” (Maxwell, Lau, & Howard, 2015; Schmidt & Hunter, 1997). Even though we know 
from the general logic of Neyman-Pearson significance testing that non-significance does not 
indicate that the null hypothesis (H0) can be accepted just because the alternative hypothesis 
(H1) is rejected (Cohen, 1994), the conclusion that a non-significant result provides evidence 
for the H0 is tempting. However, apart from the possibility that an effect is basically zero, 
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non-significance can also indicate that an effect is simply smaller than previously assumed. In 
fact, a single replication barely provides sufficient evidence to confirm the absence of an 
effect (Maxwell et al., 2015). In other words, a non-significant finding usually does not mean 
that the true effect is essentially zero. It simply tells that we found no significant evidence that 
the effect exists.  
Another common belief states that „non-significance questions the existence of an effect”. 
This belief is more appropriate because it acknowledges the possibility of both, no effect and 
a smaller effect. According to this logic, researchers often follow from a non-significant 
replication to question the theoretically suggested effect (i.e. usually H1; see Gomes & 
McCullough, 2015; Harris, Coburn, Rohrer, & Pashler, 2013; Rohrer et al., 2015). Although 
this would be correct if we had only the replication data, it is not necessarily the correct 
conclusion when we take the original data into account. The counterintuitive notion, that a 
non-significant replication does not necessarily justify skepticism about an effect, becomes 
clearer as we will demonstrate that the integration of non-significant replications into the 
analysis can make the evidence for a theoretical claim even stronger. 
A non-significant replication is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to demonstrate a 
null effect (i.e. accept H0) or even to shed doubts on a set of previous findings (i.e. reject H1). 
A smaller effect is usually still possible. Consequently a single replication can hardly disprove 
an original result or a theory but may rather add information about the reliability of the 
original effect (Simons, 2014). 
 
Evidence for unwarranted conclusions from non-significant replications 
In contrast to the statistical logic that non-significance does usually not allow to confirm 
the absence of an effect (Cohen, 1994) an analysis of 1999 volumes of the Journal of Applied 
Psychology and the British Journal of Psychology showed that flawed conclusions about non-
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significance are widespread (Finch, Cumming, & Thomason, 2001). A stunning 37% of all 
non-significant findings were interpreted by their authors as providing evidence for a null 
effect instead of acknowledging the possibility of a smaller effect. The current replication 
literature sometimes mirrors similar misconceptions. The rationale that a hypothesized effect 
is presumably non-existent because of one or more failed replications is often a prominent 
interpretation of the data. By suggesting that the original findings were probably Type I errors 
and the underlying effect not real, the possibility of an existing but smaller effect is easily 
ignored (e.g., Gil-Gómez de Liaño et al., 2016; Pashler et al., 2013; Ritchie, Wiseman, & 
French, 2012).  
Hence, if authors and reviewers sometimes tend to neglect the possibility of smaller effects 
in favor of the conclusion that an effect is not real, it would not be surprising if the recipients 
of the psychological literature including the future researchers of the field make the same 
mistake. In an exploratory study, we tested 105 German Psychology graduate students (18 
males, 4 other) to examine their beliefs about replications (for details see Appendix A & B). 
In an initial question, we first wanted to assess students’ general attitude on whether they 
believed in the benefits of replications or whether they were rather skeptic regarding the 
usefulness of replications. Ninety-five percent stated that the field needs either more direct 
(38.2%) or conceptual (56.9%) replications rather than spending more resources in the 
discovery of new research (4.9%), thus confirming a generally positive attitude towards 
replication research. In the subsequent questions, we confronted the students with scenarios of 
replication reports to assess which conclusions students were willing to approve. 
In the first scenario, the majority of our participants indicated that a single non-significant 
replication that confronts one significant original finding does not allow any conclusions 
about the effect (88%), rather than believing in the absence of an effect (11%) or in its 
existence (1%), χ2 (2) = 140.97, p < .001. Although the majority correctly indicated that the 
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data appears inconclusive considering one failed replication, only a minority resisted to draw 
strong conclusions about the absence of an effect when faced with more than one failed 
replication. After reading an abstract of a replication paper (Pashler et al., 2013) that reported 
three failed replication attempts of one original study, only one third indicated that one should 
not draw conclusions from these findings (33%). In fact, while only 2% of the students still 
expressed belief in the effect, the vast majority of students (65%) assumed that the original 
effect was presumably a false-positive finding and that the effect probably does not exist 
(χ2(2) = 62.23, p < .001) thus neglecting the possibility of a smaller effect.1 In a subsequent 
task, we assessed in more detail, which causal explanations students were willing to draw 
from a set of inconclusive studies. To provide a detailed scenario, we presented effect sizes, 
sample sizes and p-values of an original study and three non-significant replications and 
offered four possible conclusions in a multiple choice task allowing for multiple answers 
(Figure 1). The four studies allowed no clear-cut conclusion about whether the effect exists or 
not and the purpose of the scenario was not to test whether students would provide the correct 
answer (which we did not offer as a response alternative). Instead we wanted to explore to 
what extent they were willing to question the general validity of the original study and more 
specifically whether they were ready to infer questionable research practices (see Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). Fifty-eight percent indicated that the original study was 
probably a false-positive finding while 13% believed that the replications had been false-
negatives. Perhaps more worrisome, 48% were ready to believe that the original researchers 
had engaged in questionable research practices (compared to 15% on behalf of the 
replicators).  
                     
1 Ceteris paribus, the replications by Pashler et al. (2013) did of course question the reliability of the effect at 
first sight, but it is unlikely that even three replications provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 
underlying effect is basically zero. Such conclusions require tremendous sample sizes (Maxwell et al., 2015).  
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Figure 1. Grey box shows the description of a scenario with one original study and three non-
significant replications and their corresponding statistics. Participants could check each of the 
four provided answers above. Percentage of participants indicates the ratio of approval ratings 
for each answer. A random-effects meta-analysis across the exemplary data revealed a 
marginally significant and homogenous effect, N = 420, g = 0.20, 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.42], Z = 
1.91, p = .056, Q(3) = 3.52, p = .32, I2 = 14.70%. The results do not prove that the effect does 
not exist but rather indicate that the effect is probably much smaller and a bigger sample would 
be needed to provide evidence for the effect. A small effect (d > .30) is as possible as is an 
essential null effect (d < .10; see Rosenthal & Rubin, 1994). 
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Our findings tentatively suggest that a subgroup of readers of the psychological literature 
tends to overinterpret non-significant replications. In case of doubt, they disregard the 
possibility of a smaller effect and rather conclude from a set of mixed findings that an effect 
is not real. Disconcertingly, it also seems that an inconclusive but certainly expectable set of 
findings (see Cumming, 2012) can have the power to smear the reputation of the original 
researchers (and also to a much lesser extent of the replicators). 
 
The Informational Value of Failed Replications 
To answer the question what we can properly conclude from non-significant replications, 
we first have to define what we want to test. Usually, rather than testing whether a specific 
observed effect size replicates in a second experiment, we want to test the predictions of a 
theory. This is important, because psychology research usually seeks to test theories with 
ordinal hypotheses (e.g., less helpfulness, more frustration, more abstract construal level) that 
do not predict specific effect sizes. The size of an effect may be important for practitioners 
and may help other researchers to conduct future research, but it does not contain theoretically 
germane information for an ordinal hypothesis. Accordingly, psychologists are interested in 
theories – not in effects – and as long as an effect is not of irrelevant size (e.g., -0.1 < d < 0.1; 
see Maxwell et al., 2015), most theoretical assumptions are supported if the effect points in 
the predicted direction.  
Hence, the critical question is how well single replication studies can test ordinal 
hypotheses. The obtained effect size in a study varies greatly due to sampling error 
(Cumming, 2012). If the effect size in an original finding (e.g., d = 0.8) were an unbiased 
estimate of the true underlying effect, half of the replications with sample sizes based on that 
previously found effect size (see Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) would be 
sufficiently powered and the other half somewhat underpowered to detect the respective 
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effect. However, it appears that several factors lead to systematically inflated effect sizes 
among the published literature even when an effect is genuine (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016; 
Francis, 2012b; OpenScienceCollaboration, 2015). Because significant findings have a better 
chance to be published, across different researchers who test a specific theory, those with 
significant p-values and stronger effects will be more likely to publish their results. But also 
within one team of researchers, those studies, which produced significant results and stronger 
effects, are more likely to end up in the literature. Hence, replications that are based on such 
potentially inflated effect sizes (e.g., d = 0.8) are prone to be underpowered to test for the 
underlying, smaller effect (e.g., d = 0.4;  Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016; Simonsohn, 2015; 
Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014). Because we can only guess the true size of the 
underlying effect, it is helpful to reason about the required sample size for the smallest effect 
to accept the alternative hypothesis. If we wanted to test (t-test, alpha level = .05, two-tailed, 
Power = .80) whether an effect exists or is essentially non-existent (e.g., -0.10 < d < .10), the 
necessary sample size (N = 3428) is surprisingly high (see Maxwell et al., 2015). In short, if 
we cannot be sure about the true underlying size of an effect, we cannot be sure whether the 
single replication was simply underpowered to detect a smaller genuine effect or whether the 
effect is indeed negligibly small. Single replications that are based on former effect sizes 
therefore do not reliably test an ordinal hypothesis, even if the replication’s design and sample 
is adequately set to test the original hypothesis (ceteris paribus assumption). 
 
Cumulative Meta-Analysis (CMA) 
When lacking power to find an effect, a straightforward solution is to increase the 
statistical power for a test by combining the data of the available studies in a CMA. The logic 
of a CMA assumes that every new study is an additional piece of evidence that can speak in 
favor or against the existence of an effect. This approach has several benefits. First, it 
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facilitates the evaluation of a new replication, second, it allows an evaluation of the entire 
cumulated data and third, it helps to detect biases in the original or replication data. 
By adding a new replication to the existing data, the CMA reveals whether the replication 
decreases or increases the evidence for a hypothesized effect and therefore assesses the result 
of a replication given the previous findings. Although in practice non-significant replications 
usually indicate a smaller effect-size than previously reported, they can provide more rather 
than less empirical evidence for an effect by increasing the meta-analytic test statistic and 
therefore decrease the likelihood of a Type I error (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016). Thus a 
paradoxical but commonly unrecognized consequence of non-significant replications is 
evidenced by this approach. Adding a non-significant replication can even boost rather than 
diminish trust in the existence of an effect when analyzed in a CMA (Braver et al., 2014).  
As a second benefit and under the assumption that neither the original studies nor the 
replications suffer from systematic biases, a CMA is a more powerful tool to test the common 
ordinal hypotheses (i.e. effects of unspecified size) compared to the analysis of single 
studies.2 By including more data than a single study, the CMA decreases the confidence 
interval for the estimated effect size and predicts more accurately whether an effect is 
essentially zero or theoretically relevant (e.g., Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 
2009; Cumming, 2012). As a consequence, a small underlying effect in a research project 
with several studies (i.e. an unbiased set of internal replications) is much more likely to 
become statistically significant in a CMA than when evaluating each study individually. 
Moreover, if an effect is essentially zero (e.g., -0.10 < d < .10), CMA will quickly reduce the 
                     
2 Note, the integration of several studies in a meta-analysis might not yield a sufficiently large sample size to 
provide the power to detect small effects either, but it provides the highest power available to reject or accept the 
H1 without gathering more data.  
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range of plausible effect sizes up to an extent that can provide convincing evidence for the H0 
(Goh et al., 2016).  
Non-significant external replications, however, often raise suspicion that the original 
findings have been biased. If so, a CMA is still helpful, and a better approach than an isolated 
interpretation of the replication results. Effect size heterogeneity in a random-effects meta-
analysis (for details see: Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010) indicates to which 
extent a set of studies reflects the same underlying effect or not (Borenstein et al., 2009). 
Accordingly, if a reported effect is entirely based on publication bias (i.e. an essential null 
effect), a random-effects CMA will likely reflect heterogeneity among the original effects and 
the effects from the replication studies. When a heterogeneity analysis suggests different 
underlying effects (for an overview on different criteria see Borenstein et al., 2009), one 
should be cautious to interpret the cumulated effect size as an appropriate estimate (Braver et 
al., 2014). Moreover, - to the extent that one can trust in the quality of the independent 
replication studies - one may justifiably be more skeptical about the existence of the effect 
when there is considerable heterogeneity and the replication studies render an effect size 
around zero. 
Hence, while a non-significant replication study alone only informs about the statistical 
failure to replicate the considered effect-size, the CMA offers a broader scope and tells what 
most researchers want to know: Does my replication decrease or increase the statistical 
evidence for the effect and does that change my conclusion about whether the hypothesized 
effect exists or not?  
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Does My Replication Decrease or Increase the Statistical Evidence for an Effect? 
To demonstrate how a replication alters the evidence for an effect, we present examples 
with real replication data some of which decrease and others which increase the evidence for 
the effect.  
Decreasing Evidence. In a replication of Study 2 by Bargh and Shalev (2012), Wortman et 
al. (2014) did not significantly replicate the original effect that physical coldness leads to 
feelings of loneliness (p = .895, Table 1, #2). While the original study showed a significant 
result in favor of the effect, N = 75, g = 0.60, 95% Confidence Interval (CI) = [0.14, 1.07], Z 
= 2.55, p = .011,3 a random-effects meta-analysis across the original study and the replication 
(Table 1, #1-2) revealed a non-significant effect for the manipulation of physical coldness, N 
= 335, g = 0.28, 95% CI = [-0.30, 0.85], Z = 0.95, p = .345, Q(1) = 4.82, p = .028, I2 = 
79.24%. Ceteris paribus, the replication substantially decreased our confidence in the effect 
by decreasing the test-statistic to non-significance and more empirical evidence in favor of the 
effect would be required.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
3 To allow for direct comparisons between the different analyses, we calculated conventional effect sizes 
(Hedge’s g or the Odds ratio) and the corresponding Z-values throughout all analyses. Furthermore we applied 
random-effects models for all meta-analyses to allow the underlying effects to vary between studies.  
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Table 1 
Overview for Original Studies and Replications With Hedges’ g Effect Size 
Note. Summary statistics for studies with Hedges’ g effect size. N = combined sample size; g = unbiased 
standardized effect size; Var. = respective variance of the effect. CI-values represent the lower and upper 95% 
confidence intervals of the effect size of for each study.  
 
Another example comes from research by Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, and Waytz (2013a) who 
found in two studies that participants primed with the concept of money showed stronger 
beliefs in the fairness of free markets (Table 1, #3-4). Rohrer et al. (2015) replicated these 
findings by Caruso et al. (2013a) and found no significant effect (p = .474, Table 1, #5). A 
random-effects meta-analysis across both original findings showed that U.S.-American 
participants4 who were primed with images of money, reported a stronger fair-market 
ideology, N = 110, g  = 0.65, 95% CI = [0.27, 1.04], Z =3.30, p = .001, Q(1) = 0.05, p = .83, 
I2 = 0.00%. A CMA across both original studies and the replication from Rohrer and 
                     
4 Caruso and colleagues (2013) argue that US-Dollar primes only provoke stronger fair market ideologies for 
American citizens but not for non-Americans. Thus, similar to Rohrer et al. (2015), we only included U.S. 
participants throughout these studies.   
#  N g Var. Lower CI 
Upper 
CI 
1. Bargh & Shalev (2012; study 2) 75 0.60 0.06 0.14 1.07 
2.  Wortman et al. (2014) 260 0.02 0.02 -0.23 0.26 
3. Caruso et al. (2013; Study 4) 47 0.70 0.09 0.11 1.29 
4. Caruso et al. (2013; Study 5) 63 0.62 0.07 0.11 1.12 
5. Rohrer et al. (2015; Study 4) 116 0.13 0.04 -0.23 0.50 
6. Caruso et al. (unpublished A) 86 0.14 0.05 -0.28 0.56 
7. Caruso et al. (unpublished B) 240 0.16 0.02 -0.10 0.41 
8. Caruso et al. (unpublished C) 176 0.07 0.02 -0.23 0.36 
9. Caruso et al. (unpublished D) 45 0.62 0.09 0.02 1.22 
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colleagues (Table 1, #3-5) with more than twice as many participants revealed a smaller but 
still significant effect, N = 226, g = 0.43, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.81], Z = 2.23, p = .026, Q(2) = 
3.65, p = .161, I2 = 46.13%. Although the CMA still reached conventional levels of 
significance, the replication reduced the meta-analytic test statistic for the effect and therefore 
decreased the overall evidence for the effect.   
Increasing Evidence. Counterintuitively, non-significant replications can also increase the 
overall test statistic in a CMA. Thus, the addition of a non-significant replication can increase 
the evidence for an effect just like a significant replication, as the following examples 
illustrate. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) investigated in their Study 3 whether recalling an 
unethical deed would result in a higher likelihood to take an antiseptic cleansing wipe, N = 
32, Odds ratio (OR) = 1.61, 95% CI = [0.09, 3.13], Z = 2.08, p = .038. The replication by 
Gámez, Díaz, and Marrero (2011) was not significant (p = .185; Table 2 #2) and thus the 
authors reasoned that “(…) among Spanish subjects physical cleansing is not an operant 
conduct in order to restore moral purity.” (p. 160). Although the result does not allow to 
conclude that physical cleaning restores moral purity among Spanish participants, it 
paradoxically increases the likelihood that the overall effect exists. The meta-analysis across 
both studies (Table 2, #1-2) suggested that their ostensibly failed replication provided 
additional evidence for the effect by increasing the test statistic to Z = 2.40, p = .016, N = 77, 
OR = 1.31, 95% CI = [0.24, 2.38], Q(1) = 0.29, p = .589, I2 = 0.00%. In Study 4 by Zhong and 
Liljenquist (2006), the authors found that physical cleansing could reduce participants’ 
compensatory behavior (volunteering to help), when being morally threatened, N = 45, OR = 
1.41, 95% CI = [0.15, 2.67], Z = 2.19, p = .028. Once again, the replication by Gámez et al. 
(2011) showed no significant effect itself (p = .163; Table 2, #4), but increased the cumulated 
evidence (Table 2, #3-4) in favor of the effect, by increasing the test statistic from Z = 2.19, p 
= .028 in the original study to Z = 2.60, p = .009, N = 73, OR = 1.37, 95% CI = [0.34, 2.41], 
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Q(1) = 0.01, p = .923, I2 = 0.00%. When considered as a piece of cumulative evidence, these 
two replications would not be regarded as failures to replicate the effect but rather as 
additional evidence for the respective overall effects.  
 
Table 2 
Overview for Original Studies and Replications With Odds Ratio Effect Size 
Note. Summary statistics for studies with Odds ratio effect size. N = combined sample size; OR = log Odds ratio 
effect size; Var. = respective variance of the effect. CI-values represent the lower and upper 95% confidence 
intervals of the effect size of for each study.  
 
A third example how ostensible evidence against the existence of an effect can essentially 
show the opposite comes from a set of four internal replications (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & 
Waytz, 2013b; see Table 1, #8-11), which as pointed out by Rohrer and colleagues (2015) 
were not published in the original paper by Caruso and colleagues (2013a). Three out of four 
studies showed non-significant results (Table 1, #8-10). Including these three studies in 
addition to the two original studies (Caruso et al. 2013a) and the replication study by Rohrer 
and colleagues (2015), the meta-analysis (Table 1, #5-10) revealed a significant and 
homogeneous effect, N = 728, g = 0.20, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.35], Z = 2.68, p = .008, Q(5) = 
#  N OR Var. Lower CI 
Upper 
CI 
1. Zhong & Liljenquist (2006; study 3) 32 1.61 0.60 0.09 3.13 
2.  Gámez et al. (2011; study 3) 45 1.02 0.59 -0.49 2.53 
3. Zhong & Liljenquist (2006; study 4) 45 1.41 0.41 0.15 2.67 
4. Gámez et al. (2011; study 4) 28 1.30 0.87 -0.53 3.13 
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6.37, p = .27, I2 = 0.00%.5 Intuitively, one might feel tempted to interpret the unreported 
studies as evidence against the effect. However, similar to our previous examples, the 
inclusion of the three unpublished and non-significant studies provided more, rather than less 
evidence for the effect by increasing the test statistic from Z = 2.23, p = .026 to Z = 2.68, p = 
.008.  
Non-significant replications that are considered a failure on an individual level can not 
only decrease but also increase the evidence for an often smaller but real effect on a 
cumulative level (for more examples see: Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016; Scheibehenne, Jamil, & 
Wagenmakers, 2016). However, whether the overall evidence for an effect increased or 
decreased does not yet answer the theoretical question of whether the effect exists. As we will 
argue next, the consideration of the whole data also allows a well-informed answer to this 
question. 
 
Does the Effect Exist?  
The question whether an hypothesized effect should be – based on the entire given data –
considered true or not is fairly complex and much debate is going on to which extent one can 
trust published original data and how reliable new (mostly external) replications are (e.g., 
Francis, 2012a; Pashler & Harris, 2012; Stroebe & Strack, 2014). 
In an ideal research world, a set of findings would not be biased by questionable research 
practices or publication bias. In such cases, one can reliably interpret the overall estimate of a 
CMA as a good – or at least a better – indicator for the true underlying effect than each of the 
single study results. It would be thus also appropriate to conclude from such an estimate 
                     
5 A fourth unpublished finding (Table 1, #9) actually reached conventional levels of significance (p = .041) and 
was erroneously reported as a “null effect” (Rohrer et al., 2015, p. e75). A meta-analysis across the original 
studies, the replication and all four unpublished studies (Table 1, #3-9) also revealed a significant effect, N = 
773, g = 0.22, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.37], Z = 3.08, p = .002, Q(6) = 8.13, p = .23, I2 = 0.00% 
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whether an effect is likely to exist (accepting H1) or not (rejecting H1), by using null-
hypothesis significance testing or alternatively confidence intervals (Cumming, 2008) or 
Bayesian statistics (Scheibehenne et al., 2016). For instance, researchers who conduct several 
conceptually related studies can – when conducting proper analyses (Funder et al., 2013) – 
usually rule out the possibility of systematic biases. By integrating the studies into a CMA, 
those researchers will obtain a more accurate estimate and more statistical power to test their 
hypothesis. 
However, published findings are often under the suspicion of being biased and their 
respective effect sizes inflated. If some of the integrated studies in a meta-analysis are indeed 
biased, the CMA estimate is consequently biased as well and the test statistic might reflect a 
significant though false-positive effect. Thus, to deal with this dilemma, it has been suggested 
to rely solely on external, independent replications when evaluating the existence of a 
hypothesized effect (Simons, 2014). Various approaches (e.g., Simonsohn, 2015; Verhagen & 
Wagenmakers, 2014) have been proposed that provide sounder assessments of replications 
than simply asking whether the single replication is statistically significant.  
Of course, the reliance on external replications is a plausible idea, but it is associated with 
other problems. Independent replications might suffer (although possibly to a smaller extent) 
from systematic biases as well. For example the strength of the manipulation (Finkel, 2016), 
the characteristics of the sample (Dang, 2016), or the setting of the study (Wilson, 2016) 
might systematically decrease a replication’s effect size (e.g., Cesario, 2014; Fabrigar & 
Wegener, 2016; OpenScienceCollaboration, 2015). Luttrell, Petty, and Xu (in press) illustrate 
this problem by demonstrating in an exemplary replication study that the extent, to which a 
replication study actually reproduced the psychological conditions in an experiment, 
moderates whether the study replicates the original finding or not. In other words, as for any 
original study, the effect obtained in a replication study might be a biased indicator for the 
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underlying effect as well. A second problem of the exclusive analysis of external replications 
is the comparably lower statistical power. Especially with only few replications at hand, 
discarding parts of the available data might lead to insufficient power to detect smaller effects 
or to provide evidence for the absence of an effect.  
Thus, apart from approaches that rely solely on the replication data (assuming that 
replications are the only trustworthy, unbiased data), one approach is to integrate replications 
and original studies and check whether they differ. As advocated before, CMA provides such 
a tool by estimating heterogeneity in the data. Keeping the benefits from improved power, the 
heterogeneity index serves as an indicator to which extent the underlying effect sizes differ 
from each other. If the analysis indicates low levels of heterogeneity, the meta-analytic effect 
size provides a satisfying effect size estimate for the – so far available – data. But in case the 
analysis indicates substantial heterogeneity we should be more skeptic either about the 
replication(s) or about the original findings and the reliability of the effect. 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
We demonstrated the relevance of an issue that has so far only been shown from a 
theoretical perspective (Maxwell et al., 2015; Schmidt & Oh, in press) and with statistical 
simulations (Braver et al., 2014; Cumming, 2008; Fabrigar & Wegener, 2016): Non-
significant replications can not only undermine but also increase the evidence for an effect 
and thus change the current interpretation of the data. Furthermore, we showed that the 
existence of unreported, non-significant studies that might raise doubt about the validity of an 
effect among other researchers (Francis, 2012b, 2013; Vadillo, Hardwicke, & Shanks, 2016) 
can also indicate the opposite. Although some skepticism is warranted, such unreported 
findings may often weaken but may also boost the evidence for an effect in some cases. At 
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least the example of non-reported findings we reported shows that a file drawer questions the 
reported size but not inevitably the existence an effect. 
This might be viewed as old news for statisticians, methodologists and meta-analysts, but 
the rationale that non-significance does not inevitably indicate ‘no effect’ and does not even 
necessarily question a hypothesized effect seems to be often overlooked and possibly not yet 
fully ingrained among psychologists. The consequential misconceptions about non-significant 
results that we have outlined in this report seem to be widespread and can have detrimental 
consequences for original researchers, replicators and readers of the psychological literature. 
The over-interpretation of non-significant internal replications might lead to publication bias 
or ultimately to the dismissal of promising theories when too many findings turn out to be 
non-significant. The interpretation of a non-significant external replication as a piece of 
evidence for the absence of an effect – without even testing whether the replication increases 
the evidence for an effect on a cumulative level - might provoke unwarranted conclusions by 
the readers of replication reports and the replicators themselves. This should be no argument 
against replications in general, but it highlights the responsibility of researchers to carefully 
evaluate the evidence of a non-significant replication and to provide readers of replication 
reports with balanced and justified conclusions. One of the external replications we illustrated 
here (Wortman et al., 2014) gives an excellent example that many researchers already do so.   
We believe CMA can help to interpret non-significant replications in two relevant 
contexts. First, significance testing of single external replication studies is not a convincing 
method to estimate the existence of an underlying effect because it is highly unreliable. 
Researchers should evaluate and report their replications in a CMA at least complementary to 
their single analysis, to illustrate how the new replication changes the overall evidence for the 
effect (Donnellan, Lucas, & Cesario, 2015; Gomes & McCullough, 2015; 
OpenScienceCollaboration, 2015; Pecher, van Mierlo, Cañal-Bruland, & Zeelenberg, 2015). 
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If a replication increases the evidence for an effect on a meta-analytic level, it would be odd 
to conclude on a single-analytic level that it failed. Furthermore, a CMA analysis provides 
readers of replication reports with a more comprehensive picture of the different findings and 
can help researchers to gather enough cumulative evidence to show that an effect is negligibly 
small. Second, the CMA approach can also be applied for series of internal replications (e.g., 
Hall, Goh, Mast, & Hagedorn, 2016; Schuler & Wänke, 2016; Tuk, Zhang, & Sweldens, 
2015). When considering their conceptually related experiments as cumulative evidence, 
researchers should neither be discouraged by single non-significant replications and abandon 
their theory, nor should they be tempted to ignore the data. A meta-analytic approach will not 
only help to meet the newly established requirements of many journals for increased power 
(e.g., Vazire, 2016), but will also provide a more realistic and convincing summary of one’s 
research (for a primer see: Goh et al., 2016).  
Some reservations regarding the use of meta-analyses have been articulated that might 
partly apply for our proposed cumulative meta-analytic approach as well. If a part of the 
studies in a CMA is biased, then the meta-analytic estimate will be biased too (Sakaluk, 
2016). Therefore, we proposed heterogeneity analysis to discover possible differences 
between biased and unbiased sets of studies. Because common tests of heterogeneity (Q-Test, 
I2 confidence interval) lack statistical power with smaller numbers of studies (Huedo-Medina, 
Sánchez-Meca, Marín-Martínez, & Botella, 2006), it has been suggested to raise the alpha 
level (Fleiss, 1993) or to consider a cut-off criterion that does not depend on the numbers of 
studies (I2 > 50%; Braver et al., 2014). However, it might still be that real heterogeneity is not 
detected in a smaller set of diverging studies. As a second limitation of using CMA, it has 
been voiced that researchers might engage in meta-hacking, the practice of creatively 
integrating studies into a meta-analysis until the desired outcome is generated (Sakaluk, 2016; 
Ueno, Fastrich, & Murayama, 2016). Such a practice is of course perfectly possible as is any 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	23 
other questionable research practice with any other type of analyses. Cumulative implies the 
integration of all available and proper studies, but a method cannot prevent from scientific 
misconduct. However, we strongly doubt that meta-analysis will increase it either. Our hope 
is that CMA will reduce the focus on p-values and will facilitate the integration of non-
significant findings into regular research reports. Such a meta-analytic research culture that 
takes the natural occurrence of non-significant findings into account might stimulate more 
sustainable findings and might ultimately help to regain confidence in psychological research.  
  
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	24 
References 
Bargh, J. A., & Shalev, I. (2012). The substitutability of physical and social warmth in daily 
life. Emotion, 12, 154-162. doi:10.1037/a0023527 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. R. (2009). Introduction to 
meta-analysis. Chichester, U.K.: John Wiley & Sons. 
Borenstein, M., Hedges, L. V., Higgins, J. P. T., & Rothstein, H. R. (2010). A basic 
introduction to fixed-effect and random-effects models for meta-analysis. Research 
Synthesis Methods, 1, 97-111. doi:10.1002/jrsm.12 
Braver, S. L., Thoemmes, F. J., & Rosenthal, R. (2014). Continuously cumulating meta-
analysis and replicability. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 333-342. 
doi:10.1177/1745691614529796 
Caruso, E. M., Vohs, K. D., Baxter, B., & Waytz, A. (2013a). Mere exposure to money 
increases endorsement of free-market systems and social inequality. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General., 142, 301-306. doi:10.1037/a0029288 
Caruso, E. M., Vohs, K. D., Baxter, B., & Waytz, A. (2013b). Mere exposure to money 
increases endorsement of free-market systems and social inequality. [unpublished 
data].  
Cesario, J. (2014). Priming, replication, and the hardest science. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 9, 40-48. doi:10.1177/1745691613513470 
Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49, 997-1003. 
doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.12.997 
Cumming, G. (2008). Replication and p intervals: P values predict the future only vaguely, 
but confidence intervals do much better. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3, 
286-300. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00079.x 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	25 
Cumming, G. (2012). Understanding the new statistics: Effect sizes, confidence intervals, and 
meta-analysis. New York, NY: Routledge/ Taylor & Francis Group. 
Dang, J. (2016). Commentary: A multilab preregistered replication of the ego-depletion 
effect. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 1155. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01155 
Donnellan, M. B., Lucas, R. E., & Cesario, J. (2015). On the association between loneliness 
and bathing habits: Nine replications of Bargh and Shalev (2012) study 1. Emotion, 
15, 109-119. doi:10.1037/a0036079 
Doyen, S., Klein, O., Pichon, C.-L., & Cleeremans, A. (2012). Behavioral priming: It's all in 
the mind, but whose mind? PLoS ONE, 7, e29081. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029081 
Earp, B. D., & Trafimow, D. (2015). Replication, falsification, and the crisis of confidence in 
social psychology. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 621. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00621 
Etz, A., & Vandekerckhove, J. (2016). A bayesian perspective on the reproducibility project: 
Psychology. PLoS ONE, 11, e0149794. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0149794 
Fabrigar, L. R., & Wegener, D. T. (2016). Conceptualizing and evaluating the replication of 
research results. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 66, 68-80. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.07.009 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. (2009). Statistical power analyses using g* 
power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses. Behavior Research Methods, 
41, 1149-1160. doi:10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Fiedler, K., Kutzner, F., & Krueger, J. I. (2012). The long way from α-error control to validity 
proper: Problems with a short-sighted false-positive debate. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 7, 661-669. doi:10.1177/1745691612462587 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	26 
Finch, S., Cumming, G., & Thomason, N. (2001). Reporting of statistical inference in the 
journal of applied psychology: Little evidence of reform. Educational and 
Psychological Measurement, 61, 181-210. doi:10.1177/0013164401612001 
Finkel, E. J. (2016). Reflections on the commitment–forgiveness registered replication report. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11, 765-767. doi:10.1177/1745691616664695  
Fleiss, J. L. (1993). The statistical basis of meta-analysis. Statistical Methods in Medical 
Research, 2, 121-145. doi:10.1177/096228029300200202 
Francis, G. (2012a). The psychology of replication and replication in psychology. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 585-594. doi:10.1177/1745691612459520 
Francis, G. (2012b). Too good to be true: Publication bias in two prominent studies from 
experimental psychology. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 19, 151-156. 
doi:10.3758/s13423-012-0227-9 
Francis, G. (2013). Publication bias in “red, rank, and romance in women viewing men,” by 
elliot et al. (2010). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 292-296. 
doi:10.1037/a0027923 
Funder, D. C., Levine, J. M., Mackie, D. M., Morf, C. C., Vazire, S., & West, S. G. (2013). 
Improving the dependability of research in personality and social psychology: 
Recommendations for research and educational practice. Personality and Social 
Psychology Review. doi:10.1177/1088868313507536 
Galak, J., LeBoeuf, R. A., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2012). Correcting the past: 
Failures to replicate psi. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103, 933-948. 
doi:10.1037/a0029709 
Gámez, E., Díaz, J. M., & Marrero, H. (2011). The uncertain universality of the MacBeth 
effect with a spanish sample. The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 14, 156-162. 
doi:10.5209/rev_SJOP.2011.v14.n1.13 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	27 
Gil-Gómez de Liaño, B., Stablum, F., & Umiltà, C. (2016). Can concurrent memory load 
reduce distraction? A replication study and beyond. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 145, e1-e12. doi:10.1037/xge0000131 
Goh, J. X., Hall, J. A., & Rosenthal, R. (2016). Mini meta‐analysis of your own studies: Some 
arguments on why and a primer on how. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 
10, 535-549. doi:10.1111/spc3.12267 
Gomes, C. M., & McCullough, M. E. (2015). The effects of implicit religious primes on 
dictator game allocations: A preregistered replication experiment. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, e94-e104. doi:10.1037/xge0000027 
Hall, J. A., Goh, J. X., Mast, M. S., & Hagedorn, C. (2016). Individual differences in 
accurately judging personality from text. Journal of Personality, 84, 433-445. 
doi:10.1111/jopy.12170 
Harris, C. R., Coburn, N., Rohrer, D., & Pashler, H. (2013). Two failures to replicate high-
performance-goal priming effects. PLoS ONE, 8, e72467. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0072467 
Huedo-Medina, T. B., Sánchez-Meca, J., Marín-Martínez, F., & Botella, J. (2006). Assessing 
heterogeneity in meta-analysis: Q statistic or I² index? Psychological Methods, 11, 
193-206. doi:10.1037/1082-989X.11.2.193 
Hunter, J., Schmidt, F., & Jackson, G. (1982). Meta-analysis: Cumulating research findings 
across studies. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. 
Johnson, D. J., Cheung, F., & Donnellan, M. B. (2014). Does cleanliness influence moral 
judgments? Social Psychology, 45, 209-215. doi:10.1027/1864-9335/a000186 
Kahneman, D. (2012, September 26). A proposal to deal with questions about priming effects. 
[letter emailed to social priming researchers]. Retrieved from 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	28 
http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahneman 
Letter.pdf 
Korndörfer, M., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2015). A large scale test of the effect of social 
class on prosocial behavior. PLoS ONE, 10, e0133193. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0133193 
Kunert, R. (2016, May 24). Yet more evidence for questionable research practices in original 
studies of reproducibility project: Psychology.  Retrieved from 
https://brainsidea.wordpress.com/2016/05/24/a-critical-comment-on-contextual-
sensitivity-in-scientific-reproducibility/ 
Luttrell, A., Petty, R. E., & Xu, M. (in press). Replicating and fixing failed replications: The 
case of need for cognition and argument quality. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology. Retrieved from: http://www.psy.ohio-
state.edu/petty/documents/NFCReplicationFINALJESP.pdf 
Maxwell, S. E., Lau, M. Y., & Howard, G. S. (2015). Is psychology suffering from a 
replication crisis? What does 'failure to replicate' really mean? American Psychologist, 
70, 487-498. doi:10.1037/a0039400 
Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. 
Science, 349, aac4716. doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 
Pashler, H., & Harris, C. R. (2012). Is the replicability crisis overblown? Three arguments 
examined. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7, 531-536. 
doi:10.1177/1745691612463401 
Pashler, H., Rohrer, D., & Harris, C. R. (2013). Can the goal of honesty be primed? Journal 
of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, 959-964. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.011 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	29 
Pecher, D., van Mierlo, H., Cañal-Bruland, R., & Zeelenberg, R. (2015). The burden of 
secrecy? No effect on hill slant estimation and beanbag throwing. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, e65-e72. doi:10.1037/xge0000090 
Ritchie, S. J., Wiseman, R., & French, C. C. (2012). Failing the future: Three unsuccessful 
attempts to replicate bem's 'retroactive facilitation of recall' effect. PLoS ONE, 7, 
e33423. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033423 
Rohrer, D., Pashler, H., & Harris, C. (2015). Do subtle reminders of money change people’s 
political views? Journal of Experimental Psychology: General., 144, e73-e85. 
doi:10.1037/xge0000058 
Rosenthal, R. (1979). The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psychological 
Bulletin, 86, 638-641. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.86.3.638 
Rosenthal, R. (1990). Replication in behavioral research. Journal of Social Behavior and 
Personality, 5, 1-30. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1292298922?accountid=14570 
Rosenthal, R. (1997). Some issues in the replication of social science research. Labour 
Economics, 4, 121-123. doi:10.1016/S0927-5371(97)00012-2 
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1994). The counternull value of an effect size: A new statistic. 
Psychological Science, 5, 329-334. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.1994.tb00281.x 
Sakaluk, J. K. (2016). Exploring small, confirming big: An alternative system to the new 
statistics for advancing cumulative and replicable psychological research. Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology, 66, 47-54. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.09.013 
Scheibehenne, B., Jamil, T., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2016). Bayesian evidence synthesis can 
reconcile seemingly inconsistent results: The case of hotel towel reuse. Psychological 
Science, 27, 1043-1046. doi:10.1177/0956797616644081 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	30 
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (1997). Eight common but false objections to the 
discontinuation of significance testing in the analysis of research data. In L. L. 
Harlow, S. A. Mulaik, & J. H. Steiger (Eds.), What if there were no significance tests? 
(pp. 37-64). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. (2014). Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias 
in research findings (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Schmidt, F. L., Ocasio, B. P., Hillery, J. M., & Hunter, J. E. (1985). Further within-setting 
empirical tests of the situational specificity hypothesis in personnel selection. 
Personnel Psychology, 38, 509-524. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1985.tb00557.x 
Schmidt, F. L., & Oh, I.-S. (in press). The crisis of confidence in research findings in 
psychology: Is lack of replication the real problem? Or is it something else? Archives 
of Scientific Psychology. Retrieved from:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=2773582 
Schuler, J., & Wänke, M. (2016). A fresh look on money priming: Feeling privileged or not 
makes a difference. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7, 366-373. 
doi:10.1177/1948550616628608 
Simmons, J. P., Nelson, L. D., & Simonsohn, U. (2011). False-positive psychology: 
Undisclosed flexibility in data collection and analysis allows presenting anything as 
significant. Psychological Science, 22, 1359-1366. doi:10.1177/0956797611417632 
Simons, D. J. (2014). The value of direct replication. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 
9, 76-80. doi:10.1177/1745691613514755 
Simonsohn, U. (2015). Small telescopes: Detectability and the evaluation of replication 
results. Psychological Science, 26, 559-569. doi:10.1177/0956797614567341 
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D., & Simmons, J. P. (2014). P-curve and effect size: Correcting 
for publication bias using only significant results. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 9, 666-681. doi:10.1177/1745691614553988 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	31 
Srivastava, S. (2016, February 12). Reading "the baby factory" in context.  Retrieved from 
https://hardsci.wordpress.com/tag/questionable-research-practices/ 
Stanley, D. J., & Spence, J. R. (2014). Expectations for replications: Are yours realistic? 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 305-318. doi:10.1177/1745691614528518 
Stroebe, W., & Strack, F. (2014). The alleged crisis and the illusion of exact replication. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 59-71. doi:10.1177/1745691613514450 
Tuk, M. A., Zhang, K., & Sweldens, S. (2015). The propagation of self-control: Self-control 
in one domain simultaneously improves self-control in other domains. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144, 639-654. doi:10.1037/xge0000065 
Ueno, T., Fastrich, G. M., & Murayama, K. (2016). Meta-analysis to integrate effect sizes 
within an article: Possible misuse and type I error inflation. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 145, 643-654. doi:10.1037/xge0000159 
Vadillo, M. A., Hardwicke, T. E., & Shanks, D. R. (2016). Selection bias, vote counting, and 
money-priming effects: A comment on Rohrer, Pashler, and Harris (2015) and Vohs 
(2015). Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 145, 655-663. 
doi:10.1037/xge0000157 
Van Dessel, P., De Houwer, J., Roets, A., & Gast, A. (2016). Failures to change stimulus 
evaluations by means of subliminal approach and avoidance training. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 110, e1-e15. doi:10.1037/pspa0000039 
Vazire, S. (2016). Editorial. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 7, 3-7. 
doi:10.1177/1948550615603955 
Verhagen, J., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2014). Bayesian tests to quantify the result of a 
replication attempt. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143, 1457-1475. 
doi:10.1037/a0036731 
Running	head:	NO	REPLICATION,	NO	EFFECT?	 	
	32 
Wilson, A. E. (2016). Exact replications in an inexact context: Commentary on Ebersole et al. 
(2016). Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 67, 84-85. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2015.12.008 
Wortman, J., Donnellan, M. B., & Lucas, R. E. (2014). Can physical warmth (or coldness) 
predict trait loneliness? A replication of Bargh and Shalev (2012). Archives of 
Scientific Psychology, 2, 13-19. doi:10.1037/arc0000007 
Yong, E. (2016, March 4). Psychology’s replication crisis can’t be wished away. The Atlantic. 
Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/03/psychologys-
replication-crisis-cant-be-wished-away/472272/ 
Zhong, C.-B., & Liljenquist, K. (2006). Washing away your sins: Threatened morality and 
physical cleansing. Science, 313, 1451-1452. doi:10.1126/science.1130726 
 
 
 
Running head: NO REPLICATION, NO EFFECT?  
	 1	
Appendix A 
 
Study Description 
 
  
Participants. Participants were recruited online at different universities and in the laboratory at 
the University of Heidelberg. We exclusively recruited German-speaking Psychology graduate 
students to make sure our participants are regular readers of psychological literature and 
possess the necessary statistical education to evaluate our questions. We predetermined our 
minimum sample size with at least 88 participants to arrive at a power of 1-β > .80, assuming a 
medium effect size of ω  = 0.3 with α = .05 for our critical items two, three and four (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). However we recruited as many students as possible until 
our deadline of July 31, 2016. 
Sample characteristics. From 155 participants, we excluded 27 who left no data or did not 
complete the study and therefore could not be identified as Psychology graduate students. We 
further excluded ten non-Psychologists and 13 undergraduate-Psychologists who accidently 
accessed the survey online. The remaining 105 participants (18 males, 4 other) were on average 
25.4 years old (SD = 3.64). 71% of the participants reported good to very good statistical skills. 
99% reported at least advanced knowledge of the German language and 93% reported at least 
advanced knowledge of the English language.  
Language. The questionnaire was presented in German except the abstract of item 3, which 
was kept in its original English format.  
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Appendix B 
 
Study on Interpretations of Non-significant Replications 
 
Instructions:  
Dear survey participants,  
Psychological research conducts replications at increasing intervals. Thereby, past research is 
conducted one more time and researchers examine whether the results of the original study 
replicate. In the discussion on these replications, many different opinions exist. We are 
therefore interested about your opinion on replications in Psychology. 
 
Items & Results:  
1) What is your opinion on replications? (N = 102, 3 missings) 
 
a) I think more replications should be conducted, where the same 
materials are used as in the original study. 
38.2% 
b) I think more replications should be conducted, where 
researchers try to replicate an effect with different materials 
56.9% 
c) I think money, time and participants’ course credit should be 
invested in new research rather than to replicate old research. 
4.9% 
 
 
 
2) Below you will find a summary of a replication study, which could not replicate the 
original results:  
A	group	of	scientists	tested	in	one	study	the	efficacy	of	a	new	therapy	against	
depression.	Patients	reported	after	the	new	therapy	less	depressive	symptoms	
than	patients	in	the	control	group	that	had	been	treated	with	a	common	
therapy.	An	independent	research	group	repeated	this	study	and	found	no	
significant	difference	between	the	group	treated	with	the	new	therapy	and	
the	group	that	had	been	treated	with	the	common	therapy.		
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What would you conclude from these findings? (N = 105) 
a) Probably there is an effect of therapy: the new therapy is better 
than the old one. 
1% 
b) Probably there is no effect of therapy: the new therapy and the 
old one are equally efficient. 
11.4% 
c) Probably there is an inversed effect of therapy: the new therapy 
is worse than the old one. 
0% 
d) I would not draw any conclusions from these findings. 87.6% 
 
 
3) Below you will read an abstract (summary) of a scientific article that reports a replication 
study.  
In	a	simple	study	involving	64	participants,	Rasinski,	Visser,	Zagatsky,	and	Rickett	(2005)	
reported	that	requiring	people	to	make	semantic	judgments	involving	four	words	related	to	
honesty	(embedded	among	other	words)	increased	the	likelihood	that	they	would	later	admit	
to	having	engaged	in	problematic	alcohol-related	behaviors	(e.g.,	drinking	to	the	point	of	
blackout).	If	valid,	this	honesty-priming	effect	would	offer	a	powerful	intervention	to	improve	
the	validity	of	self-report	data	in	many	different	contexts.	To	determine	whether	the	effect	is	
repeatable,	we	first	attempted	two	replications	using	the	same	materials,	tasks,	and	
measures	used	by	Rasinski	et	al.	Experiment	1	repeated	the	study	with	a	sample	of	150	
students.	No	priming	effects	were	observed	here,	nor	in	a	follow-up	study	using	adults	
recruited	on	the	web	(Experiment	2).	Experiment	3	used	the	same	priming	manipulation	
together	with	a	more	refined	measure	of	response	candor	(derived	from	Paulhus,	1991).	
Again,	the	honesty-related	primes	had	no	detectable	effects. 
How would you interpret these findings? (N = 105) 
a) The original study by Rasinski et al. (2005) was presumably a 
False-Positive finding  (the effect became significant by 
chance, even though it doesn’t exist). The effect itself does 
probably not exist. 
64.8% 
b) The three replication studies were presumably False-Negative 
findings  (the replications did not become significant, even 
though the effect exists). The effect itself probably still exists. 
1.9% 
c) I would not draw any conclusions about the assumed effect 
from these findings. 
33.3% 
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4) We now show you some specific values (effect size d, sample size N, and level of 
significance p) of an original study and three replication attempts.  
A	team	of	researchers	A	obtains	the	following	result	in	their	study:		
d	=	0,6;	N	=	60;	p	=	0,03.		
Research-team	B	replicates	this	study	three	times	and	obtains	the	following	
results:	
1)	d	=	0,22;	N	=	140;	p	=	0,20		
2)	d	=	-0,04;	N	=	80;	p	=	0,86		
3)	d	=	0,16;	N	=	140;	p	=	0,35	
 
How would you evaluate these findings? What would you conclude from them? (Multiple 
answers possible, N = 105) 
a) The results of the original study is probably a False-Positive 
finding. The effect was found by chance, even though it does 
not exist. 
58.1% 
b) The results of the replication studies are probably False-
Negative findings. By chance, the effects were not statistically 
significant, even though the effect exists. 
13.3% 
c) Researchers in the original study did presumably not work 
correctly (i.e. they engaged in questionable research practices). 
47.6% 
d) Researchers in the replication studies did presumably not work 
correctly (i.e. they engaged in questionable research practices). 
15.2% 
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Abstract 
Theoretical considerations underlying the effects of money priming assume that 
priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than 
on others. However, recent research did not replicate original findings. Moreover, past 
research has not yet directly tested the assumed underlying mechanisms and has used 
one or just a few items to measure the effects of money priming. Thus, more 
systematic research is needed to shed light onto the effects of money priming. The 
aim of the present research was to administer a robust and highly reliable task that 
allows testing self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. More specifically, we tested in 
two studies the effect of money priming on self-other focus in the imitation-inhibition 
task. In line with theoretical considerations underlying the effects of money priming, 
Study 1 found an increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with 
money. In Study 2 we aim at adjusting the method of Study 1 and running a highly 
powered preregistered experiment based on a small effect size. 
 
 
Keywords: money priming, automatic imitation, self-other focus 
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Since its beginning eleven years ago, money-priming research has generated a 
wide range of surprising findings (Gasiorowska, Zaleskiewicz, & Wygrab, 2012; 
Hansen, Kutzner, & Wänke, 2013; Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013; 
Quoidbach, Dunn, Petrides, & Mikolajczak, 2010; Teng, Chen, Poon, Zhang, & Jiang, 
2016; Tong, Zheng, & Zhao, 2013; Yang et al., 2013) that led to a large number of 
publications (for review see: Vohs, 2015). In their theoretical approach, Vohs, Mead, 
and Goode (2006) assume that beside other driving mechanisms subtle money related 
stimuli heighten the accessibility of the concept of money without participants’ 
conscious awareness. The activation of this concept leads to a market pricing 
orientation (Fiske, 1991) in which actions and options are evaluated in terms of 
personal inputs and outputs. This general orientation is accompanied by an inner state 
of self-sufficiency “wherein people put forth effort to attain personal goals and prefer 
to be separate from others“ (Vohs et al., 2006, p. 1154). That is, “people become more 
self-oriented when reminded of money and thus shift their focus more toward self-
related needs and less toward the needs of other people“ (Reutner & Wänke, 2013, p. 
220). As a consequence, this psychological state causes a general focus on the self 
increasing personal goal pursuits, personal benefits, and personal performance, as 
well as decreasing the desire to interact with others (Schuler & Wänke, 2016; Vohs et 
al., 2006; Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008).  
These theoretical considerations have been supported in a series of findings. 
For example, when being primed with money, participants show an increased focus 
on one’s own benefits and goals (Gąsiorowska & Hełka, 2012; Reutner & Wänke, 
2013; Teng et al., 2016) and put more emphasis on the achievement of personal tasks 
(Boucher & Kofos, 2012; Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2013). Moreover, research has 
shown that the emphasis on the self comes along with less concern about others. For 
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instance, it has been found that subjects reminded of money are less inclined to 
interact with others (Vohs et al., 2006), to help others (e.g., Guéguen & Jacob, 2013; 
Vohs et al., 2006) and to consider other persons’ needs (Gino & Mogilner, 2014; 
Kouchaki et al., 2013).  
Despite this diverse evidence, research on money priming has recently 
undergone heavy criticism. Several money priming studies did not replicate as 
expected (Klein et al., 2014; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015; Schuler & Wänke, 
2016) and two articles became suspected (one convicted) of data fraud (cf. Pashler, 
Rohrer, Abramson, Wolfson, & Harris, 2016; Retraction, 2014). Even more troubling, 
a meta-analysis by Vadillo, Hardwicke, and Shanks (2016) suggests that the seminal 
findings on money priming that inspired the entire field (i.e., Vohs et al., 2006) might 
be biased by selective reporting and other questionable research practices. 
Therefore, more systematic research is needed to test one of the core 
assumptions underlying money priming—namely the claim that money priming leads 
individuals to focus more strongly on themselves as compared to others (e.g., Vohs et 
al., 2008). Previous research on money priming has not yet directly tested this 
suggested underlying mechanism and many of the assessed behavioral measures are 
based on one or just a few items, which goes in line with low internal reliability (cf., 
Epstein, 1980). Moreover, most studies used explicit measures that may be prone to 
demand effects. In the present study we aimed at testing whether money primes lead 
to an increased focus on the self (as compared to others) with the imitation-inhibition 
task (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & 
Prinz, 2000)—an established, unobtrusive, robust, and highly reliable trial-by-trial 
task that measures self-focus via automatic imitation. Indeed, in a recent study, 
Genschow et al. (in preparation) found in an highly powered study (N = 200) a split-
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half reliability of α = .86. Moreover, a recent meta-analysis on the imitation-inhibition 
task yielded an effect size of gz	=	1.03	for reaction times indicating a very strong 
imitation effect (Cracco et al., under review). 
 
Automatic imitation 
Individuals imitate a wide range of different behaviors including facial 
expressions (Dimberg, 1982), postures (LaFrance, 1982), gestures (Bernieri, 1988), or 
simple movements (Brass et al., 2000; Genschow & Florack, 2014; Genschow, 
Florack, & Wänke, 2013; Genschow & Schindler, 2016; Hofree, Urgen, Winkielman, 
& Saygin, 2015)—to name just a few examples. According to ideomotor theory (e.g., 
Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1990, 1997), these imitative tendencies are the result of 
shared perception-action codes in the brain. In detail, ideomotor theory assumes that 
observed actions trigger an imitative response because they activate a representation 
that contains not only visual but also motor information. An important consequence of 
this process is that there is an intrinsic overlap between self- and other-representations 
(e.g., Lamm, Bukowski, & Silani, 2016).  
A prominent task to measure imitation is the imitation-inhibition task (Brass, 
Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass et al., 2000). In this task, participants respond to a 
number while a hand on the screen either performs a congruent or incongruent 
movement. A congruent movement speeds up responses and an incongruent 
movement slows down responses. The difference in response speed between 
incongruent and congruent trials is the imitation-inhibition congruency effect. 
According to a prominent theoretical view, this congruency effect can be seen as a 
measure of self-other focus (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009). In support of this 
theory, research has shown that an increased focus on the self as compared to others 
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reduces automatic imitation (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011; Leighton, Bird, Charman, & 
Heyes, 2008; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010; Spengler, Brass, Kühn, & 
Schütz-Bosbach, 2010; van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, De Bouter, & van 
Knippenberg, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2013). For instance, Hogeveen and Obhi 
(2011) primed participants with words related to an interdependent self-construal or 
independent self-construal and found smaller congruency effects during independent 
as compared to interdependent primes. Relatedly, Spengler and colleagues (2010) 
found reduced congruency effects when increasing participants’ self-focus by letting 
them sit in front of a mirror during the imitation-inhibition task. In sum, the imitation-
inhibition task measures the degree to which individuals focus on their own, as 
compared to someone else’s motor plan, and can thus be used as an implicit measure1 
of self-other focus (e.g., Brass et al., 2009; Spengler et al., 2010). 
 
Present research 
Taken together, theoretical assumptions underlying many money priming 
findings put forward the idea that priming individuals with money makes them focus 
more on themselves than on others. Previous research supporting this claim has been 
heavily criticized, has not directly tested the underlying mechanisms, and has often 
used explicit measures with just few items that are prone to demand effects and low 
reliability. Hence, more systematic research regarding the theoretical claims of money 
priming is needed.  
The aim of the present research was to administer a robust, unobtrusive and 
highly reliable paradigm that allows testing self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis in 
the motor domain. Within the imitation-inhibition task we hypothesized smaller 
congruency effects during trials that contain money priming as compared to neutral 
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trials. In order to test this hypothesis, we first ran a pilot study. Based on the results of 
the pilot study we adapted our paradigm and then ran a highly powered preregistered 
experiment based on estimated power to detect a small effect (i.e., d = .30).  
Pilot study 
Method 
 Participants and design. In return for partial course credit, 47 students from 
Ghent University (Belgium) participated in this study. All participants reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Previous to analysis we excluded 5 participants: 
Two participants were excluded because the response box did not detect any response 
and three participants were excluded because they committed errors in more than 50% 
of the trials suggesting random responses. The final sample contained 42 participants 
(12 males) with an age ranging from 18 to 27 (M = 21.90; SD = 2.97). The design 
consisted of a 2 (congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) x 2 (priming: 
money vs. neutral) within-subject design. 
 Stimuli and apparatus. The imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2001, 
2000) was programmed using Tscope5 software (Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, 
& Vandierendonck, 2006) and was run on Asus Eee PC 1215N laptops with an 
external 17-inch Dell monitor. Responses were recorded with a custom-built response 
box, which used light sensors to detect lifting movements of participants’ index and 
middle fingers. Stimuli consisted of different frames (523 x 422 pixels). The frames 
depicted a female left hand and were positioned in order to create a mirror image of 
the participant’s right hand (i.e., the response hand). To produce an illusion of 
movement, the hand was first presented in a neutral resting position and was then 
overwritten by a second picture of the hand in the final position. The final position 
depicted the model either having the index finger or the middle finger lifted. 
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Depending on condition, the model’s hand was either lying on a bunch of money bills 
(i.e. 100€, 20€, 10€ bills) or on paper sheets that contained the exact same pixels as 
the money bills, but were regrouped in random order. 
Procedure. The pilot study was conducted at the end of a series of other 
experiments. After participants signed a written informed consent, the experimenter 
gave some general oral instructions on the imitation-inhibition task. Participants then 
ran through 8 practice trials to get familiar with the task. Afterwards, participants 
performed two blocks of the imitation-inhibition task. One block consisted of money 
stimuli and one block of neutral stimuli. The reason of using such a blocked 
manipulation instead of a trial-by-trial approach was to reduce the possibility of carry 
over effects. Moreover, to further work against carry over effects we introduced a 
short break between the two blocks. The order of the experimental blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants and each block consisted of 120 trials. After the 
experiment participants were fully debriefed and dismissed.  
Imitation-inhibition task. Within the imitation-inhibition task, participants 
had to lift their index or middle finger in response to a letter (A = lift index finger, B 
= lift middle finger) on the computer screen while watching a congruent or 
incongruent finger movement (cf. Figure 1). Incongruent trials and congruent trials 
were presented randomly. Each trial started with the appearance of a picture showing 
a female hand mirroring participants’ right hand in resting position for 500 ms. 
Afterwards, a second picture of the model lifting either the index or middle finger was 
presented for 2000 ms or until participants responded. Simultaneously the imperative 
cue (i.e. letter A or B) was displayed between the model’s index and middle finger. 
Between trials, the screen remained blank for 1000 ms.  
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 Data preparation. To prepare data for analysis, we excluded excessively fast 
and slow trials. That is, trials with a reaction time (RT) faster than 100 ms (0.02%) 
and  trials with a RT slower than 1000 ms (0.63%) were excluded (cf. Catmur & 
Heyes, 2011; Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015). For the RT analyses, 
erroneous trials (7.42%) were excluded as well.   
Results 
 Latencies. We hypothesized smaller congruency effects within money 
priming trials as compared to neutral trials. To test this hypothesis we conducted a 2 
(congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) x 2 (priming: money vs. neutral) 
ANOVA for repeated measures. The results yielded a main effect for congruency, 
F(1, 41) = 128.37, p < .001, dz = 1.75, indicating that participants responded faster in 
congruent trials (M = 410.68; SD = 23.97) than in incongruent trials (M = 447.32; SD 
= 43.85). The main effect for priming was not significant, F(1, 41) = 0.28, p = .60. 
More important for our predictions, however, was the significant interaction between 
congruency and priming, F(1, 41) = 4.09, p = .050, dz = .31, indicating smaller 
congruency effects in the money priming condition (M = 40.58; SD = 23.12) than in 
the neutral condition (M = 32.69; SD = 25.76). The results are depicted in Figure 2.  
 Error rates. In additional analyses we analyzed the error rates of the 
imitation-inhibition task with a 2 (congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) 
x 2 (priming: money vs. neutral) ANOVA for repeated measures. The ANOVA 
yielded a main effect for congruency, F(1, 41) = 32.57, p < .001, dz = .88, indicating 
that participants committed more errors in incongruent trials (M = 8.18 %, SD = 5.31) 
as compared to congruent trials (M = 3.69 %, SD = 2.90). Neither the main effect for 
priming, nor the interaction between congruency and priming was significant, F(1, 
41) < 1.18, p > .284.  
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 Additional Analyses. In two additional 2 (block order: neutral first vs. money 
first) x 2 (priming: money vs. neutral) mixed ANOVAs with block order as between 
subject factor, priming as within subject factor and the congruency effect as 
dependent variable we tested whether there were any order effects. The interaction 
between block order and priming was neither significant for latencies, F(1, 40) = 1.60, 
p = .214, nor for error rates, F(1, 40) = 0.05, p = .817. Similarly, neither for latencies, 
F(1, 40) = 2.42, p = .128, nor for error rates, F(1, 40) = 0.22, p = .639, there was a 
significant main effect of block order. These results suggest that there was no order 
effect. 
Discussion 
 By assessing the imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2001; 2000), the results 
of the pilot study showed a smaller congruency effect for the money priming 
condition as compared to the neutral condition, thereby providing first support for the 
hypothesis that money priming increases the focus on the self as compared to others 
on a basic perceptual-motor level. These results are in line with Vohs et al.’s (2008) 
theoretical account assuming that money priming leads individuals to focus more 
strongly on themselves as compared to others. However, three critical issues need to 
be further addressed in order to draw any conclusions. 
First, based on previous research suggesting that people reminded of money 
shift into work mentality (Vohs, 2015), one may argue that money priming increased 
participants’ motivation to be good at the task at hand and that increased motivation 
rather than a focus on the self drove our effects. Indeed, theoretical accounts of 
motivation suggest a strong link between motivation and cognitive control (Carver & 
Scheier, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Simon, 1967)—a process that is involved in 
the imitation-inhibition task as well. Thus, one may argue that increased working 
Running Head: MONEY AND SELF-OTHER FOCUS 11 
mentality may potentially explain the interaction between congruency and priming. 
However, it is important to note that a person’s motivation is based on the activation 
and representation of specific cognitive and behavioral goals (Kruglanski et al., 
2002). As the goal in the imitation-inhibition task is to respond as fast as possible to 
the target letters on the screen, the increased working mentality hypothesis would 
have predicted a main effect of priming. That is, the more participants should be 
motivated to be good in the task, the faster they should respond to the letters on the 
screen. As this was not the case in our experiment, we regard the alternative 
explanation of increased working mentality as rather unlikely.   
Second, it might be that attentional processes triggered our effect. That is, 
money priming may have grasped participants’ attention so participants did not focus 
on the other person’s hand anymore. However, we do not regard this alternative 
explanation as plausible, because participants’ task was to respond to the letters on the 
screen and not to the observed movements. Therefore, if money would have grasped 
participants’ attention, one should have expected slower responses and more errors in 
the money condition as compared to the neutral condition for both congruent and 
incongruent trials. This, however, was not the case indicating that the money prime 
did not grasp more attention than the control prime. Nevertheless, it might still be that 
money distracted participants’ attention from the hand, but not necessarily from the 
target letter. The random assembly of pixels in our neutral condition might, thus, not 
have been the ideal control condition. 
Third, recently, it is suggested that “researchers themselves must provide 
direct replications of their own effects” in order to deal with the unreliability of a 
single study (Cesario, 2014). Due to the natural fluctuation of p-values in significance 
testing, every study is prone to Type I and Type II and might therefore yield 
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unreliable results (Cumming, 2008). In other words, empirical findings might reflect 
empirical artifacts rather than the underlying truth because the statistical results vary 
as a function of measurement error and sampling error (see Stanley & Spence, 2014). 
However, the likelihood to obtain a finding that reflects the underlying truth can be 
increased through larger sample sizes and measures with higher reliability. To 
minimize measurement error in our pilot study we used already a highly reliable trial-
by-trial measure instead of a one-trial behavioral measure. With 120 repeated trials, 
we decreased measurement error to a minimum and increased the instrument’s 
reliability.  
However, it is important to note that despite decreasing sampling error in our 
pilot study, our finding might still be a false-positive. Moreover, although we 
controlled for color information in the neutral condition, it might still be that the 
money condition guided participants’ attention away from the model’s hand 
decreasing the congruency effect. Thus, to cope with these problems, we will run a 
preregistered study in which we change the neutral condition and adjust the a-priori 
power based on a previously set effect size. Moreover, a meta-analysis was carried 
out to cross-validate our observed effects. Specifically, we ran a meta-analysis on all 
previous published experiments that used manipulations related to self-other focus 
and the imitation-inhibition task as dependent variable. 
 
Preregistered experiment 
 Based on the results of the pilot study we expect smaller congruency effects in 
the money priming condition as compared to the control condition. In order to test this 
hypothesis we will conduct a highly powered preregistered experiment. Before data 
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collection, we will preregister the experiment (i.e., exact method, design, data 
preparation and data analysis) at the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://osf.io/). 
Method  
Participants and design. In order to estimate the sample size, we conducted a 
power analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). We 
aimed at detecting a small but still reasonable effect size with high power given 
practical limitations (Lakens, 2014). This resulted in an effect size of d = 0.30, which 
is similarly high to the effect detected in our pilot study (dz = 0.31). When using 
G*Power to estimate the sample size to detect an effect with an effect size of dz = .30 
within a dependent t-test (two-tailed), a power of 1- β = .95 and an alpha error 
probability of α = .05, the optimal sample size is N = 147 participants. 
Participants will be students from the University of Cologne (Germany) and 
will be recruited for a reaction time study in return for a payment of 5€. In line with 
the pilot study, the design of the preregistered experiment consists of a 2 (congruency: 
congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) x 2 (priming: money vs. neutral) within-subject 
design. 
 Stimuli and apparatus. Although the preregistered study is very similar to 
the pilot study, they differ in some details. First, a difference concerns the device to 
detect participants’ responses. As the participant number is rather high and our lab 
does not have more than two custom-built response boxes with light sensors, we plan 
to apply a measure that can be more easily used. That is, we plan to use keyboards to 
detect participants’ responses. Therefore, at the beginning of each trial, participants 
will be asked to press down the “G” key with their right index finger and the “H” key 
with their right middle finger. In line with the pilot study, participants are instructed 
to lift their index finger in response to the letter A and their middle finger in response 
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to the letter B displayed on the screen. The use of keyboards to measure automatic-
imitation has been found to be a reliable measure within many different studies (e.g., 
Aicken, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams, 2007; Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 
2012; Butler, Ward, & Ramsey, 2015; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird, 2015; 
Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2015). 
 Second, we will use different stimuli. That is, instead of a hand that is 
perceived as clearly female, we will use a neutral hand. Furthermore, although the 
stimuli in the money condition look similar to the pilot study, we changed the stimuli 
in the neutral condition in line with previously used money priming stimuli (e.g., 
Reutner & Wänke, 2013) to rule out the assumption that attention drives the effect. 
Specifically, we chose pictures of a model’s hand that is placed on colored paper 
sheets that match the colors of the money bills. Moreover, in order to load the paper 
sheets with a similar amount of information we printed symbols (i.e., §, #, *) and 
objects (i.e., house, bridge, tower) on the paper sheets. In total, we will us two 
different backgrounds of the model’s hand. That is, depending on condition, the hand 
will either lie on money bills or on colored paper sheets.  
Procedure. The procedure will be similar to the pilot study. First, participants 
sign an informed consent. Second, participants will run through the imitation-
inhibition task. There will be no actual cover story introduced. Instead, participants 
will read specific instructions about the imitation-inhibition task. That is, they are 
instructed to respond as fast and as accurate as possible to the letters “A” and “B” on 
the screen (A = lift index finger; B = lift middle finger). In order to get familiar with 
the task, participants will then run through 8 practice trials. Afterwards, participants 
will perform two blocks of the imitation-inhibition task. One block will consist of 
money stimuli and one block of neutral stimuli. Between these two blocks, 
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participants are allowed to take a small break. The order of the experimental blocks 
will be counterbalanced across participants and each block consists of 120 trials (i.e., 
60 congruent and 60 incongruent trials). The total amount of experimental trials is 
240. Finally, participants indicate basic demographic data — namely gender and age 
— will be fully debriefed by the experimenter and dismissed.  
 Imitation-inhibition task. In line with the pilot study, participants will lift 
their right index or middle finger in response to a letter (A = lift index finger, B = lift 
middle finger) on the computer screen while watching a congruent or incongruent 
finger movement. Incongruent trials and congruent trials will be presented randomly. 
Each trial will start with the appearance of a picture showing a neutral hand mirroring 
participants’ right hand in resting position for 500 ms. Afterwards, a second picture of 
the model lifting either the index or middle finger will be presented for 2000 ms or 
until participants respond. Simultaneously the imperative cue (i.e. letter A or B) will 
be displayed between the model’s index and middle finger. Between trials, the screen 
will be blank for 1000 ms. 
 Data preparation. In line with the pilot study, we will exclude participants 
for which no responses are detected and participants who commit errors in more than 
50 % of the trials. For each excluded participant, we will test another participant in 
order to ensure the pre-registered sample size. Moreover, in line with the pilot study 
and with past research on the same task (cf. Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cracco et al., 
2015) we will exclude trials with RT faster than 100 ms and RT slower than 1000 ms 
in order to prepare data for analysis. For the RT analyses, erroneous trials will be 
excluded as well.  
Data analysis 
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 In line with the pilot study we will report F tests and dz as measure of effect 
size in order to allow comparison and cross-referencing with the results of the pilot 
study. 
Latencies. To test our predictions we will conduct a 2 (congruency: congruent 
trials vs. incongruent trials) x 2 (priming: money vs. neutral) repeated measure 
ANOVA. We will report main effects as well as the interaction.  
Error rates. The same analyses that have been conducted for the latencies 
will be run for the error rates. 
 
 Cross-validation with previous findings. In order to cross-validate our 
findings we will descriptively compare the detected effect size in the preregistered 
study with the average effect size of previously published experiments that used 
manipulations related to self-other focus and the imitation-inhibition task as 
dependent variable. In a first step we ran a meta-analysis. Specifically, we included 
all published papers in which the imitation-inhibition task was performed by an adult 
sample after self-focus priming, neutral priming, or both (Cook & Bird, 2011; Cook 
& Bird, 2012; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; Spengler et al., 2010; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2013; Wang & Hamilton, 2015). Since research has shown that 
the effect of self-other focus reverses when it is primed from a third-person (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2013; Wang & Hamilton, 2015), we did not include self-focus effect sizes 
that used third-person primes. This procedure resulted in a sample of ten experiments 
from seven papers that were included in the meta-analysis. From these ten 
experiments we obtained ten self-focus priming effect sizes (N = 155) and five neutral 
priming effect sizes (N = 101). 
For three experiments, we were able to extract all relevant information from 
the paper (Cook & Bird, 2011; Cook & Bird, 2012; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011). For 
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another three experiments, we could calculate effect sizes on the basis of the raw data 
(Wang & Hamilton, 2013). Finally, the effect sizes of the final four experiments were 
extracted from the graphs using a computerized measurement (Leighton et al., 2010; 
Spengler et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2015). Because four experiments provided 
multiple effect sizes from the same sample of participants (e.g., within-subject 
manipulation), we used robust variance estimation with correlated effects weights and 
a small sample correction to account for the fact that these effect sizes were correlated 
(Tanner-Smith, Tipton, & Polanin, 2016). A mixed effects model with a moderator 
for condition revealed a significant difference between the congruency effect after 
self-focus (dz = 0.85) and control (dz = 1.43) priming, t(5.37) = 3.75, p = .012 (Figure 
3).2  
 In order to cross-validate the effects observed in the preregistered experiment 
with previous findings that used a similar methodological approach, we will 
descriptively compare the effect size of the congruency effect in the money priming 
condition with the meta-analytic effect size for self-focus (i.e. dz = 0.85) and the effect 
in the control condition with the meta-analytic effect sizes for control primes (i.e. dz = 
1.43). 
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Footnotes 
1 It is important to note that participants’ goal is to respond as fast and accurate as 
possible to the numbers on the screen and not to respond towards the hand on the 
screen or to engage in the same goal as the model’s hand. Thus, the congruency effect 
measures self-other focus in rather implicit way. 
2 Even though third-person primes revealed reverse effects for self-other focus, we 
repeated the meta-analysis without excluding third-person primes for interested 
readers. This analysis revealed that the difference between the self-focus (dz = 1.00) 
and control (dz = 1.44) congruency effect was close to significance, t(5.03) = 2.33, p = 
.067.  
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Figure 1. Procedure of a trial in the imitation-inhibition task. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Congruency effect as a function of priming. Error bars represent 
standard errors of the mean. 
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Figure 3. Forest plot for the relation between the reaction time based congruency 
effect in the imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2002, 2000) and self-other focus. 
 
